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Communication Breakdown:
Developing an Antitrust Model for
Multimedia Mergers and Acquisitions
H. Peter Nesvold*
INTRODUCTION
Mergers and acquisitions are back.' Through the third quarter
of 1995, corporate marriages had already totaled over $564 billion,2
and surged to an astounding $866 billion by year-end.3 Compared
to the 1980s' high of $311 billion set in 1988,4 the staggeringly
high level of recent merger activity shatters all records set in the
past decade.5 Of particular interest is the unabated pace of consoli-
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Fordham University School of Law. This Note is dedicated
to my family for their constant love and support. I would also like to thank Robert D.
Joffe, Esq., Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York, for his invaluable comments
and criticism, Professor Thane Rosenbaum for his inspirational teaching, and the editors
of the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal for their
tireless efforts. I am especially grateful to Elizabeth A. Bloomer, without whose love and
encouragement, this Note would not have been possible.
1. See Richard Lapper, Survey of Capital Sources-Year End Review, FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 1996, at 1 (commenting on the flourishing merger and acquisition activity in the
United States); Steven Lipin, Let's Do It: Disney to Diaper Makers Push Mergers and
Acquisitions to Record High, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1996, at R8 [hereinafter Lipin, Disney
to Diaper Makers] (reporting that the number of corporate mergers in the United States
and abroad reached a record in 1995); Mergers Setting Pace to Break Record of 1994,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1995, at D2 [hereinafter Mergers Setting Pace]; Steven Lipin,
Mergers, Acquisitions Rose 20% in 1st Half to Record, WALL ST. J., July 3, 1995, at A3
[hereinafter Lipin, Mergers, Acquisitions Rose 20%]; see also Mergers, Acquisitions Soar
in Information Technology, WALL ST. J., July 26, 1995, at B8 (information technology
industry).
2. Mergers Setting Pace, supra note 1, at D2; This Year's Crop of Mergers Ready
to Shatter Record, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 30, 1995, at D8; Bells Ring for Corpo-
rate Marriages: Mergers Just Shy of '94 Record, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 29, 1995, at C3.
3. Westinghouse Selling Unit, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 4, 1996, at B8; Lipin,
Disney to Diaper Makers, supra note 1, at R8; Mergers Reach $866 Billion, CHI. TRI-
BUNE, Jan. 2, 1996, at 1; Corporate Mergers Post Record: $866 Billion in '95, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 30, 1995, at 7A.
4. Mergers Set Record in '88, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1989, at D19.
5. Records set in the 1980s include $311 billion, set in 1988; $220 billion in 1987;
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dation within American industry that has resulted from such trans-
actions. Industries as diverse as technology, defense, health care,
transportation, utilities, financial services, and media are all experi-
encing an ever-accelerating stream of transactions.6 Moreover, the
size of such deals are soaring at an equally breathtaking rate: this
past year saw Disney's $19 billion acquisition of Capital Cit-
ies/ABC, Chemical Banking's $10 billion merger with Chase Man-
hattan Corporation, and Hoechst AG's $7 billion purchase of
Marion Merrell Dow. 7 Driven not only by across-the-board compe-
tition8 and rising stock prices,9 but also by dramatic and far-reach-
ing regulatory and marketplace changes,'0 corporate America is
scrambling to assemble ideal strategic fits, capture market share,
and control the points of product distribution." As a result, the
billion dollar deal in today's mergers and acquisitions scene is
$191 billion in 1986; and $144 billion in 1985. Mergers Set Record in '88, supra note
4, at D19; Deborah A. DeMott, Directors' Duties in Management Buyouts and Leveraged
Recapitalizations, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 517 (1988).
6. See Tristate Trends for '96, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Dec. 31, 1995, at F1 (banking
and financial services); see, e.g., Stocks-In the News, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 7, 1996, at
19B (health care, defense, technology); United States, MERGERS & ACQUISmONS REP.,
Jan. 1, 1996, at 5 (transportation); Utilities: Colorado Utility to Seek Termination of
Contracts Covering Over 2,000 Workers, DAILY LABOR REP. (BNA), 1995 D.L.R. 173
d16 (Sept. 7, 1995) (utility); Merge Overkill: When Big Media Gets Too Big, What
Happens to Open Debate?, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 16, 1996, at 30 [hereinafter Merge
Overkill] (media).
7. Merge Overkill, supra note 6, at 30 (discussing the Disney-Capital Cities/ABC
deal); Michael J. Mandel, Land of the Giants, BUS. WK., Sept. 11, 1995, at 34 (discussing
the Chemical Banking-Chase Manhattan merger); 1995-96 Review and Outlook; It Was
a Year of Merger Fever-and 1996 Could Be Too, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1995, at D22
(discussing Hoechst's purchase of Marion Merrell Dow).
8. Cf. Irwin Stelzer, Fools Rush into Merger Craze, SUNDAY TIMES, Feb. 18, 1996,
at Business (explaining that electricity utilities are combining to position themselves for
increasing competition).
9. Id.
10. See discussion infra part III.A (discussing recent legislation that has increased
merger and acquisition activity in the telecommunications industry).
11. See Mandel, supra note 7, at 34; Stelzer, supra note 8, at Business (explaining
that the motivations behind many mergers in 1995 were cost savings, the control of
distribution channels, and regulatory changes); Elizabeth Mooney, Paging Market Share
Indications Company Success, Says Analysts, RADIO CoMM. REPORT, Feb. 5, 1996, at 29
(explaining that market share is a leading motivation for mergers and acquisitions in the
media industry).
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becoming commonplace. 2
Despite the cheers and exhilaration of Wall Street investors that
inevitably follow each mega-deal, 3 an increasing number of com-
mentators are concerned with the antitrust implications of many of
these corporate consolidations.14  Left unattended, critics argue,
such transactions could result in unfairly maintained market power
by a few industry giants. 5 Critics further speculate that, at a mini-
mum, mergers and acquisitions result in dwindling consumer choic-
es and higher fees and prices paid by the public. 16 Consequently,
12. Exploiting Your Brands on the Internet, BRAND STRATEGY, Oct. 27, 1995, at 4,
4-5 (explaining that mega-mergers in the multimedia industry are now almost common-
place); John Higgens, System Swap Game Not an Easy One to Play, MULTICHANNEL
NEWS, Mar. 6, 1995, at 14 ("billion-dollar system acquisitions have become commonplace
in recent months"); Biotech Looks Healthy for '95, U.P.I., Dec. 28, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File (arguing that multi-billion dollar mergers in the
biotech industry will soon become commonplace); see also Career Choices, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 15, 1995, at 23 ("The banking industry is reorganizing, with mergers of
banks into larger, mega-institutions becoming commonplace ... .
13. See Stelzer, supra note 8, at Business.
14. See, e.g., Antitrust Immunity Not Supported By Data, Attorney General Con-
cludes, HEALTH CARE DAILY (BNA) (Jan. 3, 1996) (reporting concern over antitrust
immunity for health care mergers); Marvin Kitman, A Cable-Merger Monster, NEWSDAY,
Oct. 1, 1995, at 18 (media mergers); Mark Landler, Turner to Merge into Time Warner;
A $7.5 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1995, at I (reporting that some consumer
advocates are concerned about the Time Warner-Turner Broadcasting merger, because it
would link a leading provider of cable programming with the two largest cable distribu-
tors in the country); Bryan Gruley, Time Warner, Turner Facing Scrutiny on Deal, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 21, 1995, at A24 (reporting that federal regulators are eager to probe possible
antitrust issues involving the proposed merger of Time Warner and Turner Broadcasting);
Paul Farhi, Regulators Look at Turner Talks About a Merger, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1995,
at Cl (media industry).
15. See Arthur Gottschalk, Utility Merger Mania Sparks Antitrust Anxiety, J. OF
COMMERCE, Dec. 7, 1995, at Al; Farhi, supra note 14, at Cl (reporting that federal anti-
trust officials are concerned that the combination of Time Warner and Turner Broadcast-
ing might restrict competition in the market for movie distribution on pay cable networks,
because the combined company would have a tremendous ability to produce movies and
then distribute them on wholly or partially owned pay cable channels); Consumer Groups
Voice Concern Over Recent Media Mergers (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 25, 1995)
[hereinafter "CNN Broadcast"] (reporting that a merger between media giants Time
Warner and Turner could result in higher costs, less freedom of choice and lack of diver-
sity in programming).
16. See Kimberly Blanton, Smaller Banks Hope to Give Run for Money;
Megamergers Set Stage for Battle Over Customers, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 14, 1995, at 62;
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many critics argue that economic efficiency should be subordinate
to the decentralization of social, political, and economic power.17
Understandably, no industry receives such anti-merger scrutiny
as incessantly as media does." Besides the danger that newly-wed
see also Tony Munroe, Proposed Merger to Face Scrutiny, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 14,
1995, at 42 (discussing Massachusetts Attorney General Scott Harshbarger's antitrust
investigation of the proposed $2 billion Bank of Boston-BayBanks merger, and his vow
to protect the interests of consumers); CNN Broadcast, supra note 15; Paul Farhi, Time
Warner, TBS Agree On $7.5 Billion Merger; Deal to Create World's Largest Media
Company, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1995, at Al (quoting the Consumers Union and Con-
sumer Federal of America as warning that the Time Warner-Turner Broadcasting merger
"will thwart the development and expansion of widespread communications competition,
and will lead to higher cable and telephone prices").
17. Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust, Ideology, and the Arabesques of
Economic Theory, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 262 (1995) (describing the antitrust "tradi-
tionalist" as one who "sees private economic power and its distribution as comprising the
central challenge confronting a free society, and considers the maintenance of a dispersed
and decentralized private power structure to be the paramount objective of antitrust
policy"); David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1219, 1227 (1988).
The fear that large, powerful economic organizations have damaging political conse-
quences dates back at least 100 years. See id. (citations omitted); see also Eugene V.
Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHI. L. REV.
567, 570 (1947) ("Federalism, the separation of Church and State, capitalism, the antitrust
tradition, the separation of powers-all the main slogans of our political and social life
betray the same jealous preoccupation with the problem of power, and the same healthy
suspicion of government or any other overwhelming concentration of authority.").
In fact, the fear that overly concentrated industries may dominate social and political
institutions has its roots with many of the world's most esteemed thinkers. For example,
Woodrow Wilson once declared, "[i]f monopoly persists, monopoly will. always sit at the
helm of the government .... If there are men in this country big enough to own the
government of the United States, they are going to own it .... " WOODROW WILSON,
THE NEW FREEDOM: A CALL FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF THE GENEROUS ENERGIES OF
A PEOPLE 286 (1918), quoted in Adams & Brock, supra, at 267. Similarly, in 1776,
Adam Smith emphasized the dangers of unchecked economic ambition: a businessper-
son's "interest is never exactly the same with that of the public," and she or he "generally
[has] an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public ....... ADAM SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 250 (Random
House ed. 1937) (1776), quoted in Adams & Brock, supra, at 272.
18. See, e.g., Daniel Pearl, Media Consolidation Has Left and Right Worried About
Big Firms Gaining a Lock on Information, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1995, at A10; Kitman,
supra note 14, at 18; FTC Chief to Test Theory in Review of Turner Deal; Robert Pitofsky
is Making it Clear He Believes Media Mergers Deserve Special Scrutiny, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Oct. 10, 1995, at 9D [hereinafter FTC Chief to Test Theory]; Michelle Quinn,
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media mega-companies will take fewer risks in programming,
news, and information, resulting in an arena of bland content, 9
such mega-companies could also threaten the "marketplace of
ideas." 20 As noted by Robert Pitofsky, the chairman of the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC"), "too much power in too few hands
,,21Moevrth poetafrwill impair freedom of expression. Moreover, the potential for
manipulation by the media is especially ripe today, as the mergers
come in an era when, as one commentator notes, "antitrust enforce-
ment has become as loose as the language in movies.' '22 Also, with
a deregulated telecommunications2 3 industry that has resulted from
Media Mergers Raise Troubling Questions Fears of Higher Prices, Bland Content, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 23, 1995, at D1; David Lieberman, Washington Weighs Media Deals, USA
TODAY, Sept. 11, 1995, at 2B; Mike Meyers, Experts Ponder: Is This a Merger of Peril
or Promise?, STAR TRIBUNE, Aug. 1, 1995, at 10A; Merge Overkill, supra note 6, at 30.
19. Quinn, supra note 18 (quoting the warning of Ben 'H. Bagdikian, author of
"Media Monopoly"-a book that traces how the consolidation of media companies affects
news, movies, TV and politics-that "[g]reater market control means you don't need such
good writers for programs or even try to meet different tastes").
20. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (holding that
the Federal Communication Commission's "fairness doctrine," requiring that public issues
be presented by broadcasters and that each side of those issues be given fair coverage, is
constitutional) ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licens-
ee.") (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). The concept of
the "marketplace of ideas" first appeared in Supreme Court jurisprudence in Justice
Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting) ("mhe best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market."); see Joseph H. Kaufman, Beyond Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co.: Confidentiality Agreements and Efficiency Within the "Marketplace of Ideas", 1993
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 255, 260 (1993); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legiti-
mizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (1984). Legal commentators often use the concept of
the marketplace of ideas to "explain and justify" the First Amendment freedom of expres-
sion. Id. at 2; see also Kaufman, supra, at 260. Many of these commentators regard the
marketplace as "essential to our society's efforts to discover truth." Ingber, supra, at 1;
see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open").
21. FTC Chief to Test Theory, supra note 18, at 9D. Nonetheless, Mr. Pitofsky has
also been quoted as saying, "you can't violate the First Amendment through a merger."
Kirk Victor, Merger Man, NAT. J., Jan. 20, 1996, at 121.
22. Meyers, supra note 18, at 10A.
23. The term "telecommunications" means "the transmission, between or among
points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without changing in
form or content the information as sent and received." Telecommunications Act of 1996,
1996]
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startling congressional legislation,24 allowing television studios to
own and resell programming and permitting television and radio
station owners to control multiple outlets in each market,25 the
public may soon find that four or five companies control nearly all
the information delivered into its homes over television airwaves,
cable, or computer modems.26
This Note argues that a new antitrust model is necessary to
Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 3(a)(48), 110 Stat. 56, 61 (1996) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §
153(a)(48)); see also Patrick Flanagan, The 10 Hottest Technologies in Telecom: A
Market Research Perspective, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, May 1995, at" 31 (defining "tele-
communication" as "cable, interactive media, and other emerging forms of communica-
tion, as well as the standard inclusion of voice, data, and video transmission").
24. Congress recently passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Telecom Act").
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (to be codi-
fied in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). The Telecom Act is comprehensive legislation
that rewrites the Communications Act of 1934 and "provide[s] for a procompetitive,
deregulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector
deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services
... by opening all telecommunications markets to competition .... " Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference to the Telecommunications Act of 1996
[hereinafter "Statement Accompanying the Telecom Act"]; see Edmund L. Andrews,
Future Riding on Telecommunications Bill; Deregulation Will Change How People Use
Telephones, Watch TV and Use Computers, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec. 24, 1995, at
A3 (maintaining that the Telecom Act effectively rewrites the ground rules for almost
every part of the communications industry: telephone, cable television, broadcasting, and
even cyberspace). In addition to other purposes, the Telecom Act is intended to open all
telecommunications markets to competition. Statement Accompanying the Telecom Act,
supra. As a result, the Act has significant implications to the entire media industry. See
discussion infra part III.A (discussing details of the Telecom Act and its implications to
the media industry).
25. Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat. at 113 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §
202(c)(1)(A)); see infra notes 399-413 and accompanying text (discussing the Telecom
Act's effect on television and radio station ownership rules); see also Dennis H.
Leibowitz, Media Mergers: The Underlying Economic Dynamics, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 1, 1995,
at 5; Quinn, supra note 18, at Dl.
26. See Lieberman, supra note 18, at 2B; Pearl, supra note 18, at A10 (quoting Ben
Bagdikian, former dean, University of California, Berkeley Graduate School of Journal-
ism, as warning that "[w]e're evolving into a pattern in which a relatively small number
of huge firms control every step in every process in the mass media"); Paul Farhi, Media
Giants' Bedfellowship Raises Questions About Competition, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1996,
at HI (quoting William Bennett, former Secretary of Education, as maintaining, "[i]n this
new world of communications, it seems like five or six companies control just about
everything").
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analyze multimedia mergers and acquisitions. Part I provides a
brief introduction to mergers and acquisitions, including the prima-
ry benefits and adverse competitive effects of such transactions.
Part I also explains the fundamentals of antitrust merger law and
economics, and reviews the practical steps in an antitrust merger
analysis. Part II examines how courts have historically ruled in
media antitrust cases. Part I1H argues that previous court decisions
are ineffective for analyzing the rapidly changing multimedia in-
dustry, and proposes a new antitrust model for analyzing multime-
dia mergers and acquisitions. Finally, this Note concludes that the
proposed model should be adopted, because it addresses both First
Amendment and economic-based concerns.
I. INTRODUCTION TO MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND
ANTITRUST LAW
The strategic importance and long-term consequences of merg-
ers and acquisitions are well-settled in the corporate world.27 Driv-
en largely by the industrial struggle to achieve a critical competi-
tive scale, corporate consolidation is often viewed as an essential
element for success in today's global markets.28
Against this background, an increasing number of mergers and
acquisitions are raising significant antitrust concerns. 29 Neverthe-
less, the law that restrains anticompetitive mergers is often incon-
sistent and unpredictable.30 According to the late Phillip Areeda,
27. See J. WILLIAM ROWLEY & DONALD I. BAKER, INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: THE
ANTITRUST PROCESS vii (1st ed. 1991) (explaining that multinational authorities struggle
to balance competition policy with other traditional goals, such as preserving employment,
promoting exports, and generally protecting home-based industry); see also Peter Lorange
et al., Corporate Acquisitions: A Strategic Perspective, in THE MERGERS AND ACQUISI-
TIONS HANDBOOK 3 (2d ed. 1994) ("The diversified company ... constantly faces the
choice of acquisition versus internal development to achieve [long-term] growth.").
28. See ROWLEY & BAKER, supra note 27, at vii; Mandel, supra note 7, at 34.
29. ROWLEY & BAKER, supra note 27, at vii; see, e.g., Antitrust Immunity Not Sup-
ported By Data, Attorney General Concludes, HEALTH CARE DAILY (BNA) (Jan. 3, 1996)
(health care); Gruley, supra note 14, at A24 (media industry).
30. See PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS,
TEXT, CASES 1 100, at 1 (4th ed. 1988).
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a leading commentator on antitrust law, 31 "contemporary vitality of
a precedent is often affected less by what it says than by present
perceptions of the problem., 32  This is not to say, however, that
there are no settled antitrust doctrines, approaches, or policies.33 In
contrast, while relatively few, there are established standards for
applying the law.34 This part introduces those standards and de-
scribes the underlying framework for antitrust merger analysis.
First, this part examines merger and acquisition theory, includ-
ing the economic benefits and potential adverse competitive effects
of corporation consolidation. Second, this section discusses federal
antitrust merger law and the economic principles that guide its
application. Finally, this section analyzes the practical steps in the
antitrust merger analysis.
A. Mergers and Acquisitions
Because much of antitrust law seeks to halt the consummation
of anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions,35 developing an analyt-
ic model for antitrust analysis of the media industry logically re-
quires an understanding of merger theory. This sub-section ex-
plains the perennial economic benefits that drive merger and acqui-
sition activity and the corresponding competitive threats that such
transactions pose.
1. Economic Benefits of Mergers & Acquisitions
The fundamental driving force behind mergers and acquisitions,
like other investing and speculating activities, is the search for
hidden value.36 Nevertheless, just as beauty is in the eye of the
31. Mr. Areeda published a number of textbooks and a seven volume treatise of
antitrust law-the most comprehensive analysis in this area. Id. 102, at 2.
32. Id. 1 100, at 1.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (explaining that antitrust law seeks
to preclude mergers whose potential anti-competitive effects outweigh their likely bene-
fits).
36. See Geoffrey T. Boisi & Stuart M. Essig, Development of the M&A Market, in
THE MERGERS AND AcQUISMONS HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 21 (explaining that a
primary motivation of mergers is capitalizing on the underutilization of an asset). An
asset may have hidden value to the extent that its current owner may not be operating the
[Vol. 6:781
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beholder, value is in the hands of the possessor.17 An asset's value
is a very subjective measure because the asset's worth or produc-
tivity may vary significantly, depending on who owns it.38 This is
true for two primary reasons.39  First, mergers and acquisitions
facilitate the flow of assets to the most effective managers.' For
asset to its fullest capacity. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (explaining that
mergers and acquisitions facilitate the flow of assets into the hands of the most efficient
and effective managers).
37. William J. Edwards, Planning Models for M&A Analysis, in THE MERGERS AND
AcQuIsmoNs HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 39.
38. Id.; see Boisi & Essig, supra note 36, at 21.
39. Ultimately, the reasons behind a merger are as varied as the imaginations of
attorneys and investment bankers. There are, however, other less significant motivations
behind mergers and acquisitions. For example, a merger may help the acquiring firm gain
liquidity, credit or commercial status and respectability. LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 204, at 615 (1977). However, not all reasons behind
mergers make such economic or business sense. Rather, tax reasons alone motivate many
mergers. See id. There are primarily two reasons for this. First, mergers may enable
some companies to utilize tax attributes that they otherwise wouldlose. SULLIVAN, supra,
§ 204, at 615. For example, a company cannot take advantage of certain tax shields, such
as a tax-loss carryforward, if it has no profits. RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MEYERS,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 822 (4th ed. 1991). In some cases, that company
could utilize the carryforward, should it merge with another company that is showing
profits. Id. Nevertheless, the Internal Revenue Service will disallow the deduction if the
companies undertook the merger or acquisition just to use the tax-loss carryforward. Id.
at 822 n.5; see I.R.C. §§ 381-82, 384 (1994) (limiting generally the use of preacquisition
losses to offset gains). Second, a company may contemplate a merger for no other reason
than to replace non-tax deductible dividend payments on equity, with deductible interest
payments on acquisition debt. SULLIVAN, supra, § 204, at 615. Many commentators
allege that such highly-leveraged transactions, which are known as "funny money" merg-
ers, result in a corporate America that is over-leveraged and dangerously risky. See
Professor Merton H. Miller, Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture at the Royal Swedish Acade-
my of Sciences (Dec. 7, 1990) (on file with author) (arguing that finance theory does not
support such concerns); SULLIVAN, supra, § 204, at 615 (calling a funny money merger
"bizarre").
Some commentators also allege that mere financial manipulation is the motivation
behind many mergers. BREALEY & MEYERS, supra, at 824-25. For example, in an
"elastic equity" or "boot strap" merger, an acquiring firm, whose stock sells at a high
price-earnings ("P/E") ratio, purchases another firm, whose stock trades at a low P/E ratio,
with the hope that the acquired assets will gain in market value upon coming into the new
owners' hands. Id.; SULLIVAN, supra, § 204, at 615. Critics argue that such deals gener-
ally cannot succeed, however, because investors will see through the transactions' chica-
nery. BREALEY & MEYERS, supra, at 826.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1990)
("Competition ... drives out inefficient and marginal producers, releasing resources to
19961
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example, investors who bear superior managerial or technical skills
may identify corporations that are underutilizing their assets.4'
Such investors are generally willing to purchase the assets for a
premium, because they know that they can manage those assets
more efficiently.42 Therefore, the assets are worth more in the
hands of the investors than in the hands of the selling corpora-
tions.43
Second, a merger or acquisition allows two previously unrelated
higher-valued uses . );BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 39, at 823. According to
other commentators:
We view the market for corporate control, often referred to as the takeover
market, as a market in which alternative managerial teams compete for the
rights to manage corporate resources . . . . In this perspective, competition
among managerial teams for the rights to manage resources limits divergence
from shareholder wealth maximization by managers and provides the mecha-
nism through which economies of scale or other synergies available from com-
bining or reorganizing control and management of corporate resources are
realized.
Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN.
ECON. 5, 6 (1983), quoted in, Adams & Brock, supra note 17, at 292. "Economies of
scale" are defined as "savings that are acquired through increases in quantities produced."
WILLIAM BAUMOL & ALAN BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 500 (2d ed.
1982). "Synergy" is defined as "the combination of two separate phenomena which,
when combined, function more efficiently together than they would individually." MARC
Bosc, ET AL., THE M&A HANDBOOK 31 (1st ed. 1990); see also Community Publishers,
Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146, 1151 n.4 (W.D. Ark. 1995) (defining "operation-
al synergies" in the newspaper industry as "the economies of scale that can be achieved
by combining functions or departments, including accounting, administration, press rooms,
and composing departments"). The efficiency theory is not without its critics, however.
Many argue that claims of synergy are often exaggerated. See, e.g., J. Fred Weston, The
Payoff in Mergers and Acquisitions, in THE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS HANDBOOK,
supra note 27, at 65.
41. BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 39, at 823; see Boisi & Essig, supra note 36,
at 21.
42. The theory of ineffective managers is grounded in the problems of agency costs,
which indicate that individual owners of a large corporation, with dispensed ownership,
do not have sufficient incentives to expend the substantial resources required to monitor
the behavior of managers. Weston, supra note 40, at 65, 68. As a result, the mere
possibility of a takeover attempt of an inefficient firm, and the corresponding threat that
poorly performing executives could lose their jobs, promotes profit-maximizing behavior.
Id. at 68.
43. See Boisi & Essig, supra note 36, at 21 (explaining that companies profit "from
the reallocation of corporate assets to more productive uses").
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companies to achieve "economies of scale" 44 or "synergies. ' 45
Under economic theory, two entities, when combined, may be
worth more than if they had remained independent. 46 This is espe-
cially true where a merger allows the companies to either eliminate
overlapping cost centers47 or reduce transaction costs between the
two firms.48 As a result, the unified firm may reduce costs, im-
prove quality, and boost output. Synergies also result where the
combined enterprise is less risky than the constituent corporations."9
Consider, for example, the union of two companies whose revenues
are seasonal,5° or the integration of a manufacturing firm with its
sole supplier, which merely breaks even every year.5" In either
scenario, merging the firms creates value, because the combined
44. BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 39, at 821. Two merging companies will enjoy
economies of scale where the combined entity's average unit cost of production decreases
as a result of the merger. Id. at 821, 821 n.4.
45. Boisi & Essig, supra note 36, at 21; see, e.g., Weston, supra note 40, at 65.
46. Boisi & Essig, supra note 36, at 21; Weston, supra note 40, at 65; see BREALEY
& MEYERS, supra note 39, at 817-18 (stating that mergers result in "economic gain only
if the two firms are worth more together than apart").
47. See discussion infra part I.A.2.a (discussing horizontal mergers).
48. See discussion infra part I.A.2.a (discussing cost savings that drive many horizon-
tal mergers); BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 39, at 822.
49. BoSC ET AL., supra note 40, at 33.
50. BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 39, at 824. An example of this would be the
1989 merger between two electric utilities, Utah Power&. Light, which serves customers
in Utah, and PacifiCorp, which serves customers in California. Id. at 822. Utah Power's
peak demand comes in the summer for air conditioning, while PacifiCorp's peak comes
in the winter for heating. Id. The savings from combining the two firms' generating
systems were estimated in 1990 at $45 million annually. Id. Many conglomerate mergers
are prompted by this type of savings. But see id. (arguing that mergers which are moti-
vated by risk diversification are dubious, because corporate diversification does not affect
value in perfect markets, as long as investors' diversification opportunities are unrestrict-
ed).
51. See Lorange et al., supra note 27, at 5 ("Vertical acquisition is usually undertak-
en when the market for the intermediate product is imperfect, because of scarcity of
resources, criticality of the purchased products, or control over production specifications
of the intermediate product."). For example, a major airline that scheduled flights for
customers, but did not own any airplanes, would be an administrative nightmare.
BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 39, at 822. With this difficulty in mind, it would make
sense for the airline to merge with a "rent-a-plane" company that owns its own planes.
Id. This is an example of a vertical merger. See discussion infra part I.A.2.b (discussing
vertical mergers).
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entity is more economically stable.52
Thus, mergers and acquisitions may yield substantial economic
benefits to both the investor and society.53 The investor, on the one
hand, recognizes a profit for its superior managerial or technical
skills, or its ability to create economies of scale.54 On the other
hand, society also gains.55 To understand this, one must turn to
"welfare economics, ' 5 6 the branch of economic theory that is con-
cerned with the optimal allocation of resources. 57 According to the
theory of optimal resource allocation, economic resources should
be shifted to their most efficient and productive uses.58  By rede-
ploying resources in this manner, one of an economic system's
major goals is reached: to make anyone better off, as long as
someone else is not made worse off.59 This shifting of resources
to their most productive uses is known as allocative, or Pareto,
efficiency,6° and ultimately betters an economy as a whole.6 Thus,
it follows that "in a competitive market, buying out competitors is
not merely permissible, it contributes to market stability and pro-
motes the efficient allocation of resources." 62
52. Bosc ET AL., supra note 40, at 33.
53. See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text (explaining that investors profit
from mergers and acquisitions); infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text (explaining that
society benefits from mergers and acquisitions).
54. See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text (explaining that the potential for
profit is the motivation for many mergers).
55. See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text (explaining that mergers benefit
society because they shift resources to their most productive uses).
56. See PAUL SAMUELSON & WILLIAM NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 292 (14th ed. 1992)
(explaining that welfare economics is concerned with efficiency and "the best way to
organize economic activity").
57. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 401-02
(5th ed. 1985).
58. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 56, at 292-93.
59. Id. at 293, 729 (defining allocative efficiency); cf. MANSFIELD, supra note 57,
at 237 ("a perfectly competitive economy shifts resources in accordance with changes in
consumer demand").
60. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 56, at 291.
61. Id. at 149 ("An economy is efficient if it is organized to provide its consumers
the largest possible bundle of goods and services, given the resources and technology of
the economy.").
62. Syufy, 903 F.2d at 673.
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2. Potential Adverse Competitive Effects of Mergers
Notwithstanding the valuable benefits that result from certain
mergers and acquisitions,63 such transactions may pose significant
potential for adverse competitive effects. Generally, the degree to
which competition may suffer varies depending on the kind of deal
that two firms are contemplating. 64 Based on the market relation-
ship of the consolidating parties, a merger will be classified into
one of three categories: (1) horizontal-when the parties are com-
petitors;65 (2) vertical-when the parties are or could become buy-
er-seller;66 and (3) conglomerate-in every other case.67
63. See supra notes 36-62 (discussing the financial benefits of mergers).
64. This statement assumes that the merging parties have not yet consummated the
deal, because under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Acts of 1976, parties
to a proposed merger must furnish certain information to the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") before they may complete the transaction.
15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994); see also U.S. Dep't. of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n., Horizon-
tal Merger Guidelines § 0 (1992) [hereinafter "1992 Merger Guidelines"], reprinted in 57
Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992) (stating that the 1992 Merger Guidelines, which were issued
jointly by the FTC and DOJ, are forward-looking). In addition, courts will resolve doubts
as to the necessity of issuing a preliminary injunction which prevents a merger in favor
of granting the injunction. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d
252, 261 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989). Courts generally favor prevent-
ing the merger at first because once the proposed merger or acquisition is consummated,
"it becomes difficult, and sometimes virtually impossible, for a court to 'unscramble the
eggs."' Id. at 261 (quoting Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d
247, 250 (2d Cir. 1973)).
65. See Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334 (1962) (analyzing a merger
that was partially horizontal); BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 39, at 820; BAUMOL &
BLINDER, supra note 40, at 522.
66. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323 (analyzing a merger that was partially vertical);
BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 39, at 820; BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 40, at 522.
For example, a merger is vertical where it combines, into a single firm, "various stages
of production-such as mining ore, making ingot, transforming ingot into useable forms,
fabricating end products, and distributing products through wholesalers and retailers to
ultimate consumers." AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 30, 1 400 at 625. Henry Ford was
the world's first major vertical integrator. STANLEY FOSTER REED & ALEXANDRA REED
LAJAOUX, THE ART OF M&A: A MERGER AND AcQUISmON BUYOUT GUIDE 22 (2d ed.
1995). Ford's company had its own iron mills and the railroads that connected
them. Id. Ford even grew the rubber for the company's tires. Id.
67. AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 30, 1 500, at 793; BREALEY & MEYERS, supra
note 39, at 821. Conglomerate mergers can, in addition, be subdivided into three sub-
categories. Joseph P. Bauer, Government Enforcement Policy of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act: Carte Blanche for Conglomerate Mergers?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 348, 348 n.2 (1983).
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a. Horizontal Mergers
Horizontal mergers generally receive more intense scrutiny than
any other merger category. 68 According to the United States De-
partment of Justice's ("DOJ") Merger Guidelines ("1992 Merger
Guidelines"), this is especially true where the merger creates or
facilitates the exercise of "market power": 69 the ability to sustain
prices above those which supply and demand would set if the mar-
ket were competitive.7' There are primarily two. situations in which
the enhanced market power that results from a horizontal merger
may trigger anticompetitive pricing.7 First, the unified corpora-
The first is "pure" conglomerate mergers, when there is no economic relationship between
the former firms. Id.; United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 56
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). A popular classroom example of a "pure" conglomerate merger is the
union of a gun manufacturer with a producer of butter. The second sub-category is
product extension mergers, in which a producer of one product or service acquires the
producer of a closely related product or service. Bauer, supra, at 348 n.2. An example
of a product extension merger would include one between a national manufacturer of
household liquid bleach and a national producer of soaps, detergents, and cleaners. See
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 568-69 (1966). Finally, there are geograph-
ic or market extension mergers, in which a producer in one market acquires a similar
company in an adjacent market. Bauer, supra, at 348 n.2. An example of this would be
the combination of a bank that competes exclusively in the city of Denver with another
bank, offering similar services, some fifty miles away. See United States v. First Nat'l
Bancorporation, 329 F. Supp. 1003, 1006-07, 1011 (D. Colo. 1971), aff'd, 410 U.S. 577
(1973).
68. THOMAS W. BRUNNER ET AL., MERGERS IN THE NEW ANTITRUST ERA 16 (1st
ed. 1985) (discussing horizontal mergers).
69. 1992 Merger Guidelines,- supra note 64, § 0.1 ("Market power to a seller is the
ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period of
time."). It is well-recognized that the Merger Guidelines do not have the force of law.
See Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1051
(1994); Community Publishers, 892 F. Supp. at 1153 n.6. Nevertheless, many courts still
cite them. Id. More importantly, courts do not usually allow the government to take
positions that are inconsistent with the Merger Guidelines. Id. at 1161.
70. United States v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400, 1402 (S.D.
Iowa 1991); 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 0.1.
71. In addition to the two situations described, a market can exhibit noncompetitive
pricing in one other manner: express agreement by the firms within the industry to
charge a price above competitive levels. BRUNNER ET AL., supra note 68, at 17. Never-
theless, such criminal behavior, which is also known as "overt price-fixing," is covered
by Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994), and falls outside the scope of this
Note. See discussion infra part I.B.1 (explaining that this Note focuses on the Clayton
Act rather than the Sherman Act, because the Clayton Act generally deals with
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tion's market power may be significant enough to raise market
prices unilaterally.72 Unilateral market power is particularly likely
where the corresponding reduction in competition between two
firms, which produce and sell in similar markets, results in market
domination." Second, by intensifying market concentration, a
horizontal merger may impede competitive pricing where the mar-
ket's remaining firms have the opportunity to tacitly coordinate
pricing decisions.74 It is important to note, though, that merely
allowing fewer firms to operate in a particular market does not
inherently stifle competition. 75  Rather, fewer firms may actually
stimulate competition, by increasing the combined firm's econo-
mies of scale, which, in turn, enables the merging companies to
compete more effectively with larger corporations that dominate the
market.76 Consequently, antitrust law bars only those horizontal
mergers that facilitate oligopolistic behavior.77
anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions).
72. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 0.1.
73. Id.
74. See Archer Daniels Midland, 781 F. Supp. at 1421. As the court explained in
Archer Daniels Midland:
The presumption that increased concentration is likely to lead to a reduction in
competition is based on the rationale that a reduction in the number of competi-
tors in a market makes it easier for competitors to coordinate pricing and other
terms of sale, and thus more likely that they will do so.
Id. For a more in-depth discussion of market concentration and its effects on competition,
see infra part I.C.2.
75. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
76. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 319 (explaining that Congress recognized the
benefit to competition that might flow from a merger between two small companies,
where the effect of the merger is to enable the combined companies to compete more
effectively with larger corporations that dominate the market).
77. See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 0.1 (stating that the DOJ and the
FTC will not challenge mergers that are either competitively beneficial or neutral). An
oligopoly is an economic condition where only a few companies sell substantially similar
or standardized products. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F.
Supp. 41, 49 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956). Oligopoly markets often exhibit
the lack of competition, high prices, and low output of monopoly markets. Harkins
Amusement Enters. v. General Cinema Corp., 850 F.2d 477, 490 (9th Cir. 1988).
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b. Vertical Mergers
Antitrust law does not, however, scrutinize all mergers as strict-
ly as it does in the case of horizontal transactions.78 In contrast, it
treats vertical mergers79 relatively leniently because such transac-
tions are less likely to create competitive problems.8 0  This is be-
cause the merging firms, as non-competitors, generally have no
immediate ability to coordinate their actions and exercise market
power.8 l Even so, vertical mergers are not "invariably innocuous"
as a consequence.8 2
Vertical integration, 3 by tying a customer to a supplier, threat-
78. BRUNNER ET AL., supra note 68, at 16 (explaining that horizontal mergers receive
more scrutiny than any other category of merger); E. Thomas Sullivan, The Economic
Jurisprudence of the Burger Court's Antitrust Policy: The First Thirteen Years, 58
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 42-44 (1982).
79. Both vertical and conglomerate mergers are collectively referred to as "non-
horizontal" mergers. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Merger Guidelines § 4.11 n.25 (1984) [here-
inafter "1984 DOJ Merger Guidelines"], reprinted in 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984); see
infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text (discussing conglomerate mergers). According
to the 1984 Guidelines, while a non-horizontal merger could be characterized as either
"vertical" or "conglomerate" under traditional usage, the more specific label adds nothing
to the analysis. 1984 DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra, § 4.11 n.25.
80. Although the FTC and the DOJ jointly issued revised horizontal guidelines in
1992, the 1992 guidelines do not discuss non-horizontal mergers. See U.S. Dep't. of
Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statement Accompanying Release of Revised Merger
Guidelines (1992) [hereinafter "1992 Merger Guidelines Statement"], reprinted in 57 Fed.
Reg. 41,552 (1992). In fact, the agencies explicitly stated that the 1992 guidelines did
not affect or change any former policies regarding non-horizontal mergers. Id. As a
result, the 1984 merger guidelines are still the appropriate standard for analyzing non-
horizontal mergers. Id.
81. 4 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 11000, at 207 (1980);
ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 225-45
(1978); Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 135, 143 (1984); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment
of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 17 (1981).
82. 1984 DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 79, § 4.0; AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra
note 30, 502, at 794 (explaining that vertical and conglomerate mergers are to be feared
because of their potential impact on market concentration in the future).
83. Vertical integration may result not only from mergers, but also from internal
expansion. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 525-26 (1948)
(discussing internal expansion and vertical integration in the railroad industry). For
example, a milk bottler, wishing to expand vertically, may find it cheaper to develop milk
production facilities, rather than to acquire them. While the end result on competition
may be identical in either case, in the eyes of antitrust law, "corporate growth by internal
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ens to "act as a 'clog on competition,' ' 8 4 and "deprive[s] ... rivals
of a fair opportunity to compete, ' 5 because it forecloses the com-
petitors of either party from a segment of the market otherwise
open to them.86 For at least a time, "[e]very extended vertical
arrangement... denies to competitors of the supplier the opportu-
nity to compete for part or all of the trade of the customer-party to
the vertical arrangement."" In other words, while a vertical merger
does not reduce the total number of firms operating at any single
level in the market, it does pose the danger that the merged entity
will internalize all business.88 Consequently, other firms at either
market level may suddenly find themselves without customers or
suppliers.8 9
Just as a vertical merger may impede a firm's current competi-
tors from operating in a market, it may also frustrate potential new
competitors from entering that market.9 In some circumstances,
firms already in the market may view the "acquiring firm"' 91 as a
expansion is socially preferable to growth by acquisition." United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963). As a result, courts are less likely to find a viola-
tion of antitrust policy in the former situations. See Stephen G. Breyer, Symposium:
Anticipating Antitrust's Centennial: Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated
Marketplace, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1005, 1037 (1987) (discussing courts' hesitation to find
violations of antitrust law for internal expansion in the airline industry).
84. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 324 (quoting Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States,
337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949)).
85. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949), quoted in Brown Shoe, 370
U.S. at 324.
86. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 324.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 149 (1948) (motion
pictures); United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1348-57 (D.D.C. 1981) (telephone).
89, That vertical integration may result in foreclosure to competitors of customers
and suppliers is not, however, without heavy criticism. Some commentators argue that
internal transfers in a vertically-merged entity are still subject to market forces. See, e.g.,
Paul L. Joskow, The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility
Regulatory Policies, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 58-59 (1991). Such commentators maintain
that the vertically-integrated firm will still buy or sell from outside the firm, where exter-
nal transfers ultimately result in a product that costs less or is higher in quality. Id. at 58-
59.
90. See Alberta Gas Chemicals v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours, 826 F.2d 1235, 1253-54
(3d Cir. 1987) (discussing "perceived potential competition" and "actual potential compe-
tition"), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
91. In the context of a vertical merger, an "acquiring firm" is a potential entrant to
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potential entrant,92 and may have maintained competitive prices in
order to deter the acquiring firm's entry into that market.93 With
the elimination of the acquiring firm's threat of entry, however,
other firms may have the opportunity to increase prices to exces-
sive levels 94-- especially where potential entrants are few and where
the acquiring firm had unique advantages over other potential en-
trants. 95 Thus, a vertical merger between a firm already in a mar-
ket and a potential entrant to that market may remove "perceived
potential competition," ' resulting in anticompetitive behavior.97
Similarly, a vertical merger may still provoke anticompetitive
conduct---even if the market does not perceive the acquiring firm
as a potential entrant-where the acquiring firm is, in fact, "actual
potential competition."9" While losing an actual potential entrant
will not change immediate pricing decisions by market firms, the
loss eliminates a future competitor's entry into the market in a
"more procompetitive manner."99 Consequently, the merger results
in a lost opportunity for improving market performance that would
a market, whereas an "acquired firm" is one which is already in that market. 1984 DOJ
Merger Guidelines, supra note 79, § 4.11. As noted in the DOJ's 1984 Guidelines, the
terms "acquired" and "acquiring" refer "to the relationship of the firms to the market of
interest, not the way the particular transaction is formally structured." Id. § 4.11 n.26.
92. A "potential entrant" to a market is a company which has the skills, technology,
and resources necessary to scale the entry barriers to a particular industry. SULLIVAN,
supra note 39, § 205, at 633.
93. 1984 DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 79, § 4.111; SULLIVAN, supra note 39,
§ 205, at 633; see, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 655,
658-59 (1964); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174-77 (1964).
94. 1984 DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 79, § 4.111; see SULLIVAN, supra note
39, § 205, at 633 (stating that the existence of potential entrants reduces the power of
firms already in the market, by inhibiting excessive price increases); see, e.g., United
States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 531-33 (1973); FTC v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578, 580-81 (1967).
1 95. 1984 DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 79, § 4.111; see SULLIVAN, supra note
39, § 205, at 634.
96. 1984 DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 79, §§ 4.11-.112.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. § 4.12. For example, the acquiring firm could have entered through the
development of an improved product or through a "toehold acquisition," which is the
purchase of a present, small competitor. Id.
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have resulted from adding a significant competitor.' °°
c. Conglomerate Mergers
Finally, of the three categories of mergers, conglomerate merg-
ers are the least likely to pose antitrust problems. This is because
a conglomerate acquisition, by definition, is typically between firms
that operate in independent markets.'0 1 As such, the transaction
will usually not have any direct effect on competition. 1°2 This is
not to say, however, that conglomerate mergers cannot at least
impair competition. In contrast, a conglomerate merger may retain
characteristics of either a horizontal or vertical transaction and, as
a result, pose corresponding threats.10 3  In addition, some critics
generally fear that large-scale conglomerate mergers result in an
oversaturation of assets into too few hands.'°4 These critics argue
that such concentration of economic forces and decision-making
units narrows individuals' economic choices and upsets democratic
political processes. 10 5
B. Principles of Antitrust Merger Law and Economics
Generally, the word "merger" in the antitrust analysis describes
"a permanent union of previously separate enterprises."' 6 For the
most part, it is irrelevant as a matter of law whether either or both
corporations survive.1 7 Moreover, while antitrust statutes10 8 often
limit their analyses to "mergers," the word is merely a generic label
100. Id.
101. See Bauer, supra note 67, at 351 (defining a conglomerate merger as one
between companies "that were neither previously in a direct competitive relationship nor
in a buyer-supplier relationship").
102. Id. at 351-52.
103. Id. (explaining that conglomerate mergers may be less likely to threaten compe-
tition, but that they still pose the same anticompetition concerns as horizontal and vertical
mergers). For example, just like vertical mergers, conglomerate mergers may deter
perceived potential competition and actual potential competition. 1984 DOJ Guidelines,
supra note 79, §§ 4.11-.112.
104. AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 30, 530, at 881.
105. Id.; Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
1051, 1051 (1979).
106. AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 30, 500, at 793.
107. Id.
108. See infra notes 113-20 (discussing the three primary antitrust statutes-the
Clayton Act, the Sherman Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act).
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for nearly all forms of union.'°9 Likewise, antitrust statutes apply
equally to "all legal forms by which an amalgamation of assets
may be consummated."' 10 In addition, while the applicability of
such statutes to transactions effected by acquiring assets, rather
than by exchanging stock,11 was once an issue, this distinction is
no longer significant. 1
2
1. Introduction to Federal Antitrust Law
The basic statutory antitrust prohibition for anticompetitive
mergers and acquisitions is Section 7 of the Clayton Act ("Section
7"), 13 which, together with its subsequent amendments,' 1 4 isolates
109. AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 30, 500, at 793; see also Brown Shoe, 370
U.S. at 317 n.31 (explaining that legislative history explicitly states that Section 7 of the
Clayton Act applies to all mergers-horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate); infra notes
113-29 and accompanying text (discussing the principles of Section 7 of the Clayton Act).
110. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 81, 900, at 1.
111. The traditional stock transaction consists of the purchase of all the outstanding
debt and voting securities of a publicly-traded target firm by an acquiring company.
REED & LAJAOUX, supra note 66, at 287. Such deals can take many forms, including
stock redemptions, tender offers, pure stock acquisitions, and reverse mergers. Patrick S.
Dunleavy, Leveraged Buyout, Management Buyout, and Going Private Corporate Control
Transactions: Insider Trading or Efficient Market Economics?, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
685, 685 n.4 (1986) (citations omitted). In contrast, in an asset transaction, the target
transfers all of the assets used in the business that is the subject of the sale. REED &
LAJAOUX, supra note 66, at 287. Such assets include real estate, equipment, and invento-
ry, as well as "intangibles," including contract rights, leases, patents, trademarks and so
on. Id. at 283-84. These may be all or only part of the assets owned by the selling
company. Id. at 284. Stock transactions, however, are more commonly used than asset
transactions if the target company is publicly held. Dunleavy, supra, at 722.
112. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 337-38; H.R. REP. No. 1191, supra note
85, at 4 ("Congress, in granting the [FTC] power to prevent purchases of stock, did not
also give it the power to move against acquisitions of assets."). Congress eventually
extended Section 7 of the Clayton Act to reach asset acquisitions by passing the Celler-
Kefauver Act. See Act of Dec. 29, 1950, 64 Stat. 1125, 1125-26 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994)).
113. Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994)). In addition to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, there
are two other principal statutes that comprise federal antitrust law. The first statute is the
Sherman Act of 1890. Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 1 , 26 Stat. 209 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994)). Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids con-
tracts, combinations, and conspiracies that are in restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and
conspiracies to monopolize. 15 U.S.C. § 2. The other principal antitrust statute is the
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, which, as amended, prohibits "unfair methods
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and precludes transactions whose probable anticompetitive conse-
quences exceed their likely benefits." 5 Section 7 states, in relevant
part, "[n]o person... shall acquire... any part of the stock...
or any part of the assets of another person. . ., where in any line
of commerce ... in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoly."' 1 6 While Section 7 is typically enforced by
either the FTC or the Antitrust Division of the DOJ,"' a private
of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994).
In addition to the Sherman, Federal Trade Commission, and Clayton Acts, rules
promulgated by agencies in certain regulated industries, such as banking and railroads,
may restrict antitrust mergers and acquisitions. See BRUNNER ET AL., supra note 68, at
ix n.3. For example, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 provides for review of
mergers of bank holding companies by the Federal Reserve Board. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)
(1994); see also BRUNNER ET AL., supra note 68, at 115. Similarly, the Interstate Com-
merce Act authorizes the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate mergers of rail-
road, motor, and water carriers. 49 U.S.C. §§ 11343(a), (d)(l)-(2) (1994); see also BRUN-
NER ET AL., supra note 68, at 119.
,Within the media industry, both newspapers and telecommunications companies are
subject to some merger regulation by administrative agencies. See BRUNNER ET AL.,
supra note 68, at 120-21, 123-24 (discussing briefly the standards and procedures of
merger enforcement in the newspaper and telecommunications industries). For example,
the Newspaper Preservation Act authorizes a limited antitrust merger exemption, where
a newspaper is in financial trouble. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1994); see also BRUNNER ET
AL., supra note 68, at 120. Also, mergers among telecommunications companies may
require approval by the FTC. Id. at 123. Nevertheless, merger enforcement by adminis-
trative agencies other than the DOJ or the FTC is outside the scope of this Note. Instead,
this Note focuses only on developing an antitrust model for multimedia mergers and
acquisitions that complies with Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
114. Section 7 of the Clayton Act was last amended in 1984. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1984).
115. Interface Group v. Massachusetts Port. Auth., 816 F.2d 9, 10 (1st Cir. 1987);
7 PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1500, at 362-63 (1986); see C. Paul Rogers, The
Limited Case for an Efficiency Defense in Horizontal Mergers, 58 TUL. L. REV. 503, 509
(1983) ("[Ihe lessening of competition should not be considered 'substantial' unless the
potential anticompetitive aspects significantly outweigh, on balance, the procompetitive
potentialities of the merger."). Part I.A.2, supra, explores the possible anticompetitive
effects of mergers. Similarly, part I.A.1, supra, discusses the likely benefits that follow
from mergers.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
117. The DOJ and the FTC have concurrent authority to enforce Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1994) (granting administrative authority to the DOJ to
enforce the Clayton Act); id. § 21(a) (granting administrative authority to the FTC to
enforce the Clayton Act); see also IRVING SCHER, ANTITRUST ADVISOR § 8.01, at 8-3
(1995) ("The Department of Justice... shares with the Federal Trade Committee (FTC)
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party who claims actual or prospective damage as a result of a
merger may also bring an enforcement action."' More importantly,
private plaintiffs may still attack a merger, even if the government
has approved or settled the disputed transaction." 9 Should a court
or enforcement agency find a violation of Section 7, that court or
agency may order an injunction against the merger or an order
compelling divestiture of the property or other interests. 20
Some commentators find Section 7 most striking for its "ambig-
uous language" and "enigmatic generality":12 ' "any line of com-
merce;" "substantially to lessen competition;" "tend to create a
monopoly.' 2 These commentators add that a reader will not find
clarification of such phrases elsewhere in the statutory language.
2 3
Moreover, as noted in Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion in
Brown Shoe v. United States,24 "[a] review of the legislative histo-
ry of [Section 7 and its amendments] provides no unmistakably
the authority to enforce [Section 7] of the Clayton Act."). In addition, in recent years,
state attorney generals have begun to review proposed mergers that may affect consumers
within their states. See REED & LAJAOUX, supra note 66, at 65.
118. See, e.g., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
League, 791 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987); Affiliat-
ed Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 1564 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1053 (1986).
119. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 373 (1973);
Cableamerica Corp. v. FTC, 795 F. Supp. 1082, 1086 (N.D. Ala. 1992). The law is,
however, unsettled as to whether and under what circumstances private parties may bring
such antitrust challenges. REED & LAJAOUX, supra note 66, at 65.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (authorizing the FTC to order the divestment of assets and stock
acquired in violation of Section 7); REED & LAJAOUX, supra note 66, at 58.
121. See BRUNNER ET AL., supra note 68, at 3 ("The language of Section 7 is terse
and ambiguous."); see also 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
106, -at 14 (1978) ("Neither the language nor the legislative history of the federal antitrust
laws is very illuminating about what specifically is allowed or prohibited .... ).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (emphases added); see Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dept. Stores
Co., 881 F. Supp. 860, 867 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that Congress did not define precise-
ly what it meant by some of its terms in Section 7).
123. BRUNNER ET AL., supra note 68, at 3 ("There is little enlightenment as to these
generalities elsewhere in the statutory language .... ").
124. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). Brown Shoe was the first Supreme Court decision to
interpret the amended Section 7. Id. at 311. Although Brown Shoe was decided in 1962,
it is still frequently cited as one of the controlling Supreme Court decisions for antitrust
law. See, e.g., Bon-Ton Stores, 881 F. Supp. at 867.
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clear indication of the precise standards the Congress wished the
Federal Trade Commission and the courts to apply in judging the
legality of particular mergers."'125 Therefore, with no definitive
standards to apply, courts and enforcement agencies have broad
power in determining the scope of Section 7.126
This is not to say, however, that there is no guidance available
for evaluating mergers. The Supreme Court, in Brown Shoe, con-
structed a framework for antitrust analysis, using the congressional
fears of "a rising tide of economic concentration" that prompted the
Clayton Act and its subsequent amendments. 127 As originally stated
in the legislative history surrounding the original Clayton Act and
its subsequent amendments, 21 it was this dynamic force of econom-
ic concentration that Congress sought to halt "at its outset and
before it gathered momentum."129
2. Framework for Section 7 Analysis-Economic
Principles as Guidance
While the Brown Shoe Court uncovered many of the congres-
sional goals behind the Clayton Act, the Court could neither identi-
fy nor devise any definitive quantitative or qualitative test to gauge
the anticompetitive effects of a given merger. 3 ' Nevertheless,
while the lack of a "bright line" test complicates a merger's evalua-
tion, Section 7's ambiguity does not preclude an antitrust analy-
sis.'3' As the Court noted in Brown Shoe, Congress intended that
125. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 315.
126. See Bon-Ton Stores, 881 F. Supp. at 866 ("A review of the relevant statutes
reveals that Congress intended to vest the courts with broad power to prohibit and enjoin
mergers and acquisitions .... ).
127. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 315-16 ("Throughout the recorded discussion may be
found examples of Congress' fear not only of accelerated concentration of economic
power on economic grounds, but also of the threat to other values a trend toward concen-
tration was thought to pose.").
128. H.R. REP. No. 1191, supra note 85, at 8 (stating that Section 7 is intended to
permit intervention in incipient monopolies); S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5
(1950) ("The intent here ... is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency
. ...."); S. REP  No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914) (enunciating reasons for enactment
of the Clayton Act).
129. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 318.
130. Id. at 321-22.
131. See Lissa Lamkin Bromine, The Influence of Enhanced Thrift Institution Powers
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economic principles guide the statute's application to specific
mergers:132 whether a merger lessens competition or creates a
monopoly cannot be determined without a detailed consideration of
economic and market realities. 133 Consequently, a court or enforce-
ment agency must view a merger functionally-in the context of
the merger's particular industry. 34
In addition to evaluating a merger comparatively, a court or
agency must concentrate on the relevant economic and business
facts of each individual case.135 Such "facts," however, need not
be unequivocal-Congress was concerned with probabilities, not
certainties. 36 As the Court in Brown Shoe reasoned, other statutes
proscribed "clear-cut menaces to competition." 137
on Commercial Bank Market Expansion, 67 N.C. L. REV. 795, 821 (1989) (explaining that
while there are "no definite quantitative or qualitative tests ... to determine whether [a
merger] may 'substantially' lessen competition .... other relevant factors ...help to
gauge a merger's probable effect on competition") (citations omitted).
132. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 322 n.38.
133. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992)
(Sherman Act) ("Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual
market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law."); General Indus. Corp. v. Harz
Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 805 (8th Cir. 1987); Bon-Ton Stores, 881 F. Supp. at 869.
134. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 321-22. Such industries, according to'the Court,
should be evaluated with a number of factors in mind, including: (1) how fragmented or
concentrated the industry is, and (2) whether the industry "had seen a recent trend toward
domination by a few leaders or had remained fairly consistent in its distribution of market
shares among the participating companies." Id. at 322.
135. See id. at 321 n.36 (discussing some of the transaction-specific factors that
Congress considered relevant in determining whether a particular merger is
anticompetitive); United States v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400, 1402
(S.D. Iowa 1991) (explaining that an antitrust merger analysis requires consideration of
"other factors" pertinent to the transaction); see also Bon-Ton Stores, 881 F. Supp. at 877
(examining the business facts of the pa!ticular merger).
136. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323. The Senate was explicit on this point:
The use of these words ['may be'] means that the bill, if enacted, would not
apply to the mere possibility but only to the reasonable probability of the pre-
scribed [sic] effect .... The concept of reasonable probability conveyed by
these words is a necessary element in any statute which seeks to arrest restraints
of trade in their incipiency and before they develop into full-fledged restraints
violative of the Sherman Act. A requirement of certainty and actuality of injury
to competition is incompatible with any effort to supplement the Sherman Act
by reaching incipient restraints.
S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 128, at 6, quoted in Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323 n.39
(alterations in original).
137. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323; see supra note 113 (describing the Sherman Act
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C. Practical Steps for Antitrust Merger Analysis
In following the Brown Shoe court's guidance for Section 7
jurisprudence, courts have developed a three-step test for the anti-
trust merger analysis: (1) define the relevant market; (2) estimate
the merging firms' strength in the relevant market; and (3) examine
industry- and transaction-specific factors. 38
1. Define the Relevant Market
The first step in any antitrust analysis is defining the relevant
market in which the merging firms operate. 139 According to Sec-
tion 7's language, this first step requires a determination of the
combined entity's "line of commerce," or product market, 14° and
the "section of the country," or geographic market, in which it
operates. 141 In constructing the "outer boundaries of a product
market,"' 42 a court or enforcement agency will first focus on how
reasonably interchangeable a product is with its substitutes. 143
and the Federal Trade Commission Act-two other statutes that deal with "clear-cut
menaces to competition").
138. See Archer Daniels Midland, 781 F. Supp. at 1402 (describing a four-step
analysis, where step one, defining the relevant market, is broken down into two compo-
nents: the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market); see also infra
notes 139-74 and accompanying text (defining "product markets" and "geographic mar-
kets").
139. The requirement for a relevant market definition stems from Section 7's pro-
scription of anticompetitive mergers "in any line of commerce. .. in any section of the
country." 15 U.S.C. § 18. As a result, the determination of the relevant market is a
necessary predicate for finding a Section 7 violation. United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours, 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
140. Products are grouped into a market to create "a line of commerce," because of
the competition that exists among them. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377
U.S. 271, 275 (1964); see also United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 457
(1964) (holding that a line of commerce is a market for a product).
141. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillian, 113 S. Ct. 884, 892 (1993); United States
v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 618-19 (1974); Bon-Ton Stores, 881 F. Supp.
at 867.
142. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325.
143. See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 1.11 n.9. As an aid in determin-
ing the product market, the DOJ and the FTC have created the "five-percent" test. Id. §
1.11; see Bon-Ton Stores, 881 F. Supp. at 872. Under the five-percent test, the DOJ and
the FTC seek to identify a group of products upon which a hypothetical monopolist could
profitably impose at least a "small but significant and nontransitory" price increase. 1992
Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 1.11; Bon-Ton Stores, 881 F. Supp. at 872. In
making this determination, the DOJ and the FTC, in most contexts, will use a price
increase of five percent lasting for the foreseeable future. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra
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Keeping price, use, and qualities in mind, the more that products
are reasonably interchangeable, the more likely it is that they
should be in the same product market." Such interchangeability
is also measured from both the demand and supply sides. 45 From
the demand, or consumers', side, the test is "cross elasticity of
demand": 46 how easily consumers can substitute one product for
another. 47 In contrast, the test from the supply, or producers', side
is "cross elasticity of supply": 4 how easily producers, who do not
currently make the relevant product, may alter their production in
order to produce it.' 49 Therefore, even if consumers do not consid-
er two products substitutes, those two products may still constitute
a single product market for antitrust purposes, if producers can
easily substitute production of one for the other.50
Determining the relevant product market also requires consider-
ing whether certain products are usually bought or sold as a
note 64, § 1.11; Bon-Ton Stores, 881 F. Supp. at 872. The smallest group of products
that satisfies this test is then considered to be the product market. 1992 Merger Guide-
lines, supra note 64, § 1.11; Bon-Ton Stores, 881 F. Supp. at 872.
144. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325; see also United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours, 351 U.S. 377, 395, 404 (1956). According to the Brown Shoe Court, "the
boundaries of the relevant market must be drawn with sufficient breadth to include the
competing products of each of the merging companies and to recognize competition
where, in fact, competition exists." 370 U.S. at 326.
• 145. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325 ("The outer boundaries of a product market
are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of de-
mand between the product itself and substitutes for it,"); id. at 325 n.42 ('The cross-
elasticity of production facilities may also be an important factor in defining a product
market .... ).
146. Id. at 325; Hayden Publ. Co. v. Cox Broadcasting Corp., 730 F.2d 64, 70 n.9
(2d Cir. 1984); Adams & Brock, supra note 17, at 312 ; WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD, PUBLIC
POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 163-64 (7th ed. 1985); see William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 960 n.39 (1981).
147. Hayden Publ. Co., 730 F.2d at 70 n.8, 71; Adams & Brock, supra note 17, at
312; SHEPHERD, supra note 146, at 163-64.
148. Id.; Landes & Posner, supra note 146, at 948-49; see Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at
325 n.42 (calling this variable "cross-elasticity of production facilities").
149. Harry Boadwee, Product Market Definition for Video Programming, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 1210, 1217 (1986).
150. For example, in the eyes of most consumers, a wooden table leg is not a reason-
able substitute for a baseball bat. See id. at 1217 n.38. Nevertheless, the two would be
included in the same antitrust product market, if manufacturers could substitute production
of the former, for the latter, with relative ease. See id.
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group. 15' In such cases, the "cluster market" doctrine requires that
the products, although not substitutes for one another, be grouped
together into a single product market.'52 For example, in United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank,' a leading case concerning
the cluster market doctrine, the Supreme Court ruled that commer-
cial banking services, including checking accounts, commercial
loans, and savings accounts, constitute a single cluster market.' 54
As such, the services should be evaluated separately from the mar-
kets for the services of savings banks, commercial loan companies,
and other financial institutions.5 5 Thus, while various commercial
banking services are not substitutes for each other, the fact that
they are usually purchased in a group justifies treating them as a
single product market. 56
Finally, drawing the relevant "line of commerce" also requires
examining the market's competitive performance and supplier con-
duct. 157  This approach focuses on the supplier's ability to price
discriminate, which is the capacity to manipulate a product's
price.' 58 Price discrimination is typically accomplished by either
charging different prices for the same product at different times, 59
151. United States v. Household Fin. Corp., 602 F.2d 1255, 1258 (7th Cir. 1979);
United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1375-76 (D.D.C. 1981).
152. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 359-61
(1970); Note, Rationalizing Antitrust Cluster Markets, 95 YALE L.J. 109, 117 n.41 (1985).
When a consumer consistently purchases goods from one supplier, even though those
goods are not substitutes, the practice is known as "one-stop shopping." See In re Grand
Union Co., 102 F.T.C. 812, 998-99, 1044 (1983). According to one commentator, cable
and satellite television offer "one-stop shopping," while broadcast television does not.
Boadwee, supra note 149, at 1226. As a result, cable and satellite television would be
subject to "cluster market" principles, while broadcast television would not. Id.
153. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
154. Id. at 356; see also Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank, 399 U.S. at 359-61.
155. See Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 356 ("Some commercial banking
products or services are so distinctive that they are entirely free of effective competition
from products or services of other financial institutions .....
156. Id. at 359-61.
157. SULLIVAN, supra note 39, §§ 25-30, at 80-90, § 32, at 92-93.
158. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETI-
TION AND ITS PRACTICE § 14.1, at 516 (1st ed. 1994).
159. This phenomena, which is known as "temporal price discrimination," was a
common practice used by the motion picture industry in the 1930s and 1940s. See
Boadwee, supra note 149, at 1221; see, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334
U.S. 131, 144-45, 170-71 (1948). In Paramount Pictures, the Supreme Court examined
1996]
808 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
or by "bundling"' 6 the products and selling them as a group for a
price lower than the sum of the individual products' prices.'16
Generally, where a producer can sell the same product to consum-
ers at different prices, either through temporal price discrimination
or through bundling, the product market definition must be nar-
rowed to include only that product.162 This is because persistent
price discrimination indicates a lack of effective competition in the
market. 63 As a result, antitrust law narrows the product market to
protect "diehard consumers '' 64 from discretionary exercises of mar-
the motion picture industry's custom of running the same film in a series of "runs," sepa-
rated by "clearance" times. See id. at 144-45 & n.6 (defining "clearances" and "runs").
Each run, in turn, was coupled with a corresponding drop in the movie ticket price. Id.
at 170-71 (finding that certain contract provisions required first-run theaters to charge the
highest price, the second-run theaters the next highest, and so on). Such practices serve
to maximize the amount of consumer surplus that a supplier can capture, by coercing the
consumers who value the product more to pay a higher price. See Boadwee, supra note
149, at 1221-22. The practice of exhibiting films in runs still exists today. See, e.g.,
Syufy, 903 F.2d at 665.
160. "Bundling" is defined as a consolidated packaging of services. See Eric T.
Werner, Something's Gotta Give: Antitrust Consequences of Telephone Companies' Entry
into Cable Television, 43 FED. COM. L.J. 215, 230 (1991).
161. See Boadwee, supra note 149, at 1222 (citations omitted). Commodity bundling
may be subdivided into "pure" bundling, where the individual products cannot be pur-
chased separately, and "mixed" bundling, where the individual products can be purchased
separately from the bundle. Id.
162. Id. at 1222 n.87. Nevertheless, at least one commentator has argued that the
Supreme Court has never "articulated" this analysis. SULLIVAN, supra note 39, § 17, at
62.
163. 2 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW I 534a2, at 179
(1995).
164. A "diehard consumer" is one who has a decided preference for a particular
product, even though others find the product substitutable. Boadwee, supra note 149, at
1223 (citations omitted). Some lines of commerce are especially susceptible to diehard
consumers. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S.
85, 106-07 (1984) (finding that the pricing structure for NCAA college football is unre-
sponsive to consumer demand); International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242,
250 (1959) (finding that spectators are willing to pay "substantially more" for tickets to
championship boxing fights than for nontitle fights); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. FTC,
414 F.2d 974, 979 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970).
In describing one type of diehard consumer, the Columbia Broadcasting court ex-
plained that:
A [typical phonograph record] club member is one who prefers to sit at home
and select records rather than make many trips to the store; wants guidance in
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ket power.165  Ultimately, the consequence of including products
that are not subject to price discrimination in the same market as
those that are is that the investigating court or agency will perceive
the price discriminator as having less market power than it actually
has, resulting in a skewed antitrust analysis."6
Once a court or enforcement agency has determined the product
market, it must delineate the relevant geographic market.' 67 In
general, the concerns behind geographic markets parallel those of
product markets: both definitions ultimately turn on product substi-
tutability, the clustering doctrine, and market behavior. 168 Regard-
ing the geographic market, the "area of effective competition"' 169 is
either the area in which consumers reasonably turn to obtain substi-
tute products or the area defined by actual sales patterns and con-
repertoire selection; seeks economic values and is willing to accept the disad-
vantages of club membership such as long waiting periods for delivery, limited
selection and a contractual commitment as to the number of purchases.
Id.
165. Boadwee, supra note 149, at 1228.
166. See Walker Process Equip., Inc., v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382
U.S. 172, 177 (1965) (holding that "[w]ithout a definition of [the product] market there
is no way to measure [the] ... ability [of the challenged acquisition] to lessen or destroy
competition"); Bon-Ton Stores, 881 F. Supp. at 867 (noting that many antitrust cases
hinge on the definition of the relevant product market); see also id. at 869 (finding that
an overbroad definition of the relevant product market results in an antitrust merger
analysis that fails to acknowledge anticompetitive behavior).
167. See Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 618 ("Determination of the relevant
product and geographic markets is 'a necessary predicate' to deciding whether a merger
contravenes the Clayton Act ...."); Bon-Ton Stores, 881 F. Supp. at 867 ("A necessary
first step in the evaluation of an antitrust claim is a determination of the relevant product
market and geographic market."); Archer Daniels Midland, 781 F. Supp. at 1402 (explain-
ing that a determination of the relevant geographic market is the second step of a Clayton
Act analysis).
168.. See Warren G. Lavey, Inconsistencies in Applications of Economics at the
Federal Communications Commission, 45 FED. COM. L.J. 437,470 (1993); Roger D. Blair
& Jeffrey L. Harrison, Public Policy: Cooperative Buying, Monopsony Power, and
Antitrust Policy, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 331, 360 (1992) (discussing product market substitut-
ability and market behavior as factors for determining the relevant geographic market);
Werner, supra note 160, at 234.
169. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 359. In Philadelphia National Bank, the
Supreme Court found that "in banking, as in most service industries, convenience of
location is essential to effective competition." Id. at 358.
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sumer convenience and preference.170 The geographic area may be
as small as a city and its environs,1 71 or as large as the entire na-
tion,17 ' depending on the nature of the product in question. 7 3  Fi-
nally, where a merger has both horizontal and non-horizontal ele-
ments, there may be more than one geographic market for each
aspect of the transaction. 74
2. Estimate the Merging Firms' Strength in the Relevant
Market
Once a court or enforcement agency has defined the relevant
market, the second step is to estimate the degree of power that the
unified firm would possess in that market. 75  Determining market
power requires a series of ministeps: (1) identifying the competitor
firms; 176 (2) computing market shares; 177 and, (3) calculating market
170. Id. at 358-59. Alternatively, the relevant geographic market has been defined
as the region "where, within the area of competitive overlap, the effect of the merger on
competition will be direct and immediate." Id. at 357.
171. See, e.g., Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. at 619. In Marine Bancorporation, the
Court held that where a large, nationally charted bank acquired a medium-sized state
bank, the relevant geographic market was the metropolitan area in which the acquired
bank conducted business. id. at 606-07, 619.
172. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 337; Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 361-62.
173. 1984 DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 79, § 2.31.
174. See, e.g., Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 328, 339. In Brown Shoe, the Court created
separate geographic markets for the horizontal and vertical aspects of the deal. See id.
at 328, 339. With regard to the horizontal aspect of the merger, the Court recognized that
while the transaction was between two shoe retailers, the merging companies sold shoes
in mutually exclusive geographic markets: one in cities with populations over 10,000, and
the other in very small communities. See id. at 339. As a result, the Court concluded
that the relevant geographic market, for purposes of the horizontal analysis, was cities of
10,000 or more, and the corresponding environs in which both companies retailed through
their own outlets. Id. In contrast, the vertical aspect of the Brown Shoe merger united
the nation's fourth largest shoe manufacturer with a retailer owning and operating the
nation's largest independent chain of family shoe stores. Id. at 300, 303. Consequently,
the Court held that the appropriate geographic market, for purposes of analyzing the
vertical element of the merger, was the entire nation. Id. at 328.
175. Archer Daniels Midland, 781 F. Supp. at 1402; see SULLIVAN, supra note 39,
§ 22, at 74 (stating that after defining the relevant market, the next step is to determine
the merging firms' position relative to those with which it competes).
176. See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 1.3.
177. See id. § 1.4.
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concentration.17 The first two ministeps are relatively easy. First,
an in-depth analysis of the relevant product and geographic markets
usually establishes all competitors. 9 According to the 1992 Merg-
er Guidelines, competitors include firms that currently produce or
sell the market's products in the market's geographic area.8 In
addition, competitors may include other firms, depending on their
likely supply responses to a "small but significant and
nontransitory" price increase by the unified firm. 81 Such potential
competitors, 1 2 however, will only be considered if they would
likely enter the market within one year, and without the expendi-
ture of significant sunk costs.1
83
The second ministep, computing market shares, is equally
straight-forward. Market shares for all market participants are
based on the total sales or capacity currently devoted to the rele-
vant market, together with what would be devoted to the relevant
market in response to a "small but significant and nontransitory"
price increase.1" In addition, the market shares can be expressed
either in dollar or physical terms, through measurement of sales,
shipments, or production.18
5
178. See id. § 1.5.
179. Laura L. Stephens, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act: Closing an Antitrust Loophole, 75 B.U. L. REV. 477, 495 (1995).
180. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 1.0,
181. Id.; see supra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing "cross elasticity of
demand" and reasonable demand substitutes).
182. Potential competitors, in this context, are known as "uncommitted entrants."
1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 1.32.
183. Id. "Sunk costs" are defined as "[c]osts which have been incurred and cannot
be reversed." BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 39, at GI0.
184. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 1.41.
185. Id.; United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 US. 563, 571 (1966) (expressing
market share in dollar terms of sales); United States v. International Boxing Club of N.Y.,
Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 240 (1955) (expressing market share in terms of number of champion-
ship boxing matches held in the United States between June 1949 and March 1952);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (expressing
market share in terms of physical production). Courts are entitled to rely on any of
several indicia of market share for media firms, as well. See Syufy, 903 F.2d at 666 n.10
(holding that market share indicia for an exhibitor of films may include "its percentage
of first-run films, its percentage of first-run playdates and its percentage of gross box
office receipts").
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In contrast to the first two ministeps for estimating the merging
firms' strength in the relevant market, the third---calculating market
concentration-is often an abstract and inexact process.1 6 General-
ly, market concentration is "a function of the number of firms in
a market and their respective market shares."'' 8 7 Nonetheless, there
is no structural test or methodology for carrying out this general
rule that is consistently reliable.188  In fact, in many of the earlier
antitrust decisions, courts determined market concentration and the
corresponding market power of the merging firms on an ad hoc
basis.189  For example, in United States v. Aluminum Company of
America,190 the court held that the defendant, the Aluminum Com-
pany of America ("Alcoa"), possessed monopoly power, based
simply on the company's massive 90 percent share of the relevant
market.' 9' Similarly, in United States v. Grinnell192 and Amplex of
Maryland, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corporation,93 87 percent of
a national market,' 94 and 60 percent of a relevant market, 95 respec-
186. See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 494-504
(1973) (holding that while the Government's statistical showing might have been suffi-
cient to support a finding of "undue concentration" in the absence of other considerations,
the district court was justified in finding that other pertinent factors affected the coal
industry and that the appellees' business mandated a conclusion that no substantial lessen-
ing of competition occurred or was threatened by the acquisition in question). Media is
one industry in which concentration is particularly abstract and difficult to measure. See,
e.g., Robert Bennett, Media Concentration and the FCC: Focusing with a Section Seven
Lens, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 159, 161 (1971).
187. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 1.5.
188. See SULLIVAN, supra note 39, § 22, at 76 ("It would be a boon if there were
a self-executing, two dimensional structural test for monopoly power-if the need were
simply to define the market and compute defendant's share to see if it exceeds a critical
threshold.").
189. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 424.
190. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
191. Id. at 429; see also SULLIVAN, supra note 39, § 22, at 76. One commentator
argues that Alcoa's 30-60-90 rule for determining market concentration is too rigid,
because it produces "false positive" risk (the risk of setting the critical percentage too
low) and "false negative" risk (the risk of establishing a critical percentage that is too
high). SULLIVAN, supra note 39, § 22, at 76.
192. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
193. 380 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1036 (1968).
194. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71, 576.
195. Amplex, 380 F.2d at 115.
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tively, were held to constitute monopolies. In contrast, the Su-
preme Court in United States v. United States Steel Corporation
196
and United States v. International Harvester Company197 held that
there was no monopoly power where the defendant firms controlled
50 percent 98 and 64 percent' 99 of their respective markets. 2°°
In an attempt to move away from such ad hoc decisions and to
allow corporations to better anticipate when an agency might chal-lenge a particular merger,2"' the trend for determining market con-
centration has been toward applying the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index ("HHI"),2 2 which is calculated by summing the squares of
the individual market shares of all the market participants.2 3 Be-
cause the HHI calculation squares the market shares, it gives pro-
portionately greater weight to larger firms, in accord with their
relative importance in the market.2 4 As a result, a lack of informa-
tion about a market's smaller firms is generally not critical, be-
cause such firms do not affect the HHI calculation significantly.2 °5
196. 251 U.S. 417 (1920)
197. 274 U.S. 693 (1927)
198. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. at 445; see also id. at 451 ("the law does
not make mere size an offence [sic]").
199. Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. at 709; see also id. at 708 ("The law.., does not
make the mere size of a corporation ... an offense.").
200. See SULLIVAN, supra note 39, § 22, at 75 (discussing United States Steel Corpo-
ration and International Harvester Company).
201. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 0.
202. See, e.g., id. § 1.5; FTC v. PPG Industries, 798 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir.
1986); Archer Daniels Midland, 781 F. Supp. at 1421.
203. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 1.5. The 1992 Merger Guidelines
offer an example of the HHI: a market consisting of four firms, with market shares of
30 percent, 30 percent, 20 percent and 20 percent, has an HHI of 2600 (302 + 302 + 202
+ 202 = 2600). Id. § 1.5 n.17. The HHI ranges from 10000 (in the case of a pure mo-
nopoly) to a number approaching zero (in the case of a market with many firms, all of
which have infinitesimal market shares). Id.
204. Id. § 1.5.
205. Id. § 1.5 n.17. Courts have, at times, downplayed the reliability of the HHI.
See United States v. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d 981, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ('The Herfindal-
Hirschman Index cannot guarantee litigation victories."); see also United States v. Citizens
& S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120 (1975) (holding that while data on market shares may
be sufficient, standing alone, to make a prima facie showing of anticompetitiveness, the
parties to the merger can still rebut by "show[ing] that the market-share statistics gave an
inaccurate account of the ... probable effects on competition").
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Both the FTC and the DOJ have adopted the HHI as a useful
framework for antitrust analysis.2°6 According to those agencies,
a post-merger market that has an HHI of below 1000 is generally
regarded as "unconcentrated." 20 7 Ordinarily, neither agency chal-
lenges mergers in such markets, because the transactions are un-
likely to pose adverse competitive threats.2 °8 In contrast, a post-
merger HHI between 1000 and 1800 is a "moderately concentrated"
market. °9 Still, mergers in such markets usually go unchallenged
where the mergers increase the HHI less than 100 points. 210 The
FTC and the DOJ will, however, further analyze transactions in
"moderately concentrated" markets where the HHI increases more
than 100 points.21 According to the enforcement agencies, this is
because mergers in such markets pose "significant competitive
concerns."
212
Finally, the FTC and the DOJ broadly categorize those markets
that have an HHI above 1800 as "highly concentrated. 2 13 Yet,
neither enforcement agency is likely to investigate mergers in high-
ly concentrated markets where the HHI increases less than 50
points. 1 4 If, however, this HHI increases more than 50 points, a
merger will raise "significant competitive concerns. 2 1 5 Moreover,
where the transaction increases the HHI 100 points or more, the
FTC and the DOJ each presumes that the merger will likely create
or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise.21 6
3. Examine industry- and transaction-specific factors
After defining the relevant market and estimating the merging
firms' market power, the final step of the antitrust inquiry is to
introduce factors that are specific to the structure of the merger's
206. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 1.5; Bon-Ton Stores, 881 F. Supp.
at 875 (describing the 1992 Merger Guidelines' reference to the HHI).
207. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 1.5.
208. Id. § 1.51.
209. Id. § 1.5.
210. Id. § 1.51.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. § 1.5.
214. Id. § 1.51.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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particular industry and the merger transaction itself.2 .7 The factors
that are usually examined include difficulty of entry into the mar-
ket218 and efficiencies that result from the merger. 21 9  Regarding
entry analysis, the 1992 Merger Guidelines state that a merger is
not likely to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its
exercise if entry into the market is so easy that market participants,
after the merger, either collectively or unilaterally could not profit-
ably maintain a price increase above pre-merger levels. 220 Entry is
considered "easy" where it would be timely, likely, and sufficient
in its magnitude, character, and scope to deter or counteract the
competitive effects of concern.22' In such situations, the merger
217. See General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. at 494-504 (holding that while the
Government's statistical showing might have been sufficient to support a finding of
"undue concentration" in the absence of other considerations, the district court was justi-
fied in finding that other pertinent factors affecting the coal industry and appellees'
business mandated a conclusion that no substantial lessening of competition occurred or
was threatened by the acquisition); FTC v. National Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694, 700 (8th Cir.
1979); Archer Daniels Midland, 781 F. Supp. at 1402; see generally Brown Shoe, 370
U.S. at 311-23 (finding that Congress intended that a variety of economic and other
factors be considered in determining whether the merger was consistent with maintaining
competition in the industry in which the merging companies operated). In Philadelphia
National Bank, the Supreme Court found that:
[I]ntense congressional concern with the trend toward concentration warrants
dispensing, in certain cases, with elaborate proof of market structure, market
behavior, or probable anticompetitive effects. Specifically, we think that a
merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the
relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of
firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially
that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the
merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363.
218. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 3.0; see, e.g., Syufy, 903 F.2d at 664;
Oahu Gas Serv., Inc., v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 366 (9th Cir.) ("A high
market share, though it may ordinarily raise an inference of monopoly power, will not do
so in a market with low entry barriers or other evidence of a defendant's inability to
control prices or exclude competitors.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870
(1988); Bon-Ton Stores, 881 F. Supp. at 876.
219. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 4; see Syufy, 903 F.2d at 669 ("Fos-
tering an environment where businesses fight it out using the weapon of efficiency ...
is what the antitrust laws are meant to champion .... ).
220. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 3.0; see also Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d
at 664 (quoting 1984 DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 79, § 3.3).
221. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 3.0.
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raises no significant antitrust implications and ordinarily requires
no further analysis.222
Similarly, both the FTC and the DOJ might permit an otherwise
anticompetitive merger where the transaction may be reasonably
necessary to achieve significant net efficiencies.223 Such efficien-
cies may include economies of scale, better integration of produc-
tion facilities, plant specialization, lower transportation costs, and
similar efficiencies relating to specific manufacturing, servicing, or
distribution operations of the merging firms.224 The FTC or the
DOJ may also consider, although to a lesser degree, claimed effi-
ciencies resulting from reduction in general selling, and administra-
tive and overhead expenses.22
In addition to entry and efficiency analyses, many commenta-
tors argue that antitrust enforcement should consider the social and
political implications of the proposed transaction. 26 This argument,
which is one of the most controversial issues affecting antitrust
jurisprudence, 27 gained significant prominence with Congress'
passing of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment 228 to Section 7 in
222. Id.; see also Colorado Interstate Gas v. Natural Gas Pipeline, 885 F.2d 683,
695-96 n.21 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 972 (1989); Syufy, 903 F.2d at 664 (quot-
ing 1984 DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 79, § 3.3).
223. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 4.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 105, at 1051; Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Section 7 of
the Clayton Act and the Pursuit of Economic "Objectivity": Is There any Role for Social
and Political Values in Merger Policy?, 60 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 273 (1985).
227. Symposium, Recent Developments in the Telecommunications and Cable TV
Industries, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 427, 430 (1996) (comments
of Robert D. Joffe, Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore); Kirk Victor, Merger Man, NAT.
J., Jan. 20, 1996, at 118 (profiling Robert Pitofsky, currently one of the biggest supporters
of incorporating social and political concerns into the antitrust analysis); Statement on
Competition Policy and Mergers in the Telecommunications Industry: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1993) (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Professor,
Georgetown University Law Center) ("It has become common for antitrust economists,
academics and lawyers to argue that the antitrust laws should be interpreted exclusively
to serve economic goals-I believe that is wrong.").
228. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1994)).
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1950.229 While such concerns subsequently guided many antitrust
decisions during the Warren Court era,23° they have remained rela-
tively dormant since the 1970s. 23' Nonetheless, the recent trend
toward consolidation in the media industry,232 and the alleged corre-
sponding threat to the marketplace of ideas,233 has prompted many
antitrust experts in academia, industry, and government to reopen
for debate the role of social and political concerns in the antitrust
analysis.234
229. According to the Brown Shoe Court:
The dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 amend-
ments was a fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic con-
centration in the American economy .... Throughout the recorded discussion
may be found examples of Congress' fear not only of accelerated concentration
of economic power on economic grounds, but also of the threat to other values
a trend toward concentration was thought to pose.
Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 315-16; see also supra notes 113-37 and accompanying text
(discussing history of the legislation and its amendments).
230. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S.
546 (1966); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, reh'g denied, 377 U.S. 1010 (1964); United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294 (1962); Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297
F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
231. See Symposium, supra note 227, at 446 (comments of Creighton O'M. Condon,
Esq., Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York, NY); see also Cann, supra note 226,
at 276 (arguing that United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), was
the pivotal decision in removing social and political concerns from the antitrust analysis).
232. For example, Walt Disney acquired Capital Cities/ABC, Westinghouse pur-
chased CBS, and Time Warner has announced a merger with Turner Broadcasting. Pearl,
supra note 18, at A10. Other notable media mergers in the recent past include those
between Time and Warner, and between Viacom, Paramount and Blockbuster. Dennis
Leibowitz, Media Mergers: The Underlying Economic Dynamics, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 1, 1995,
at 5. In addition, the past few years have seen a number of multi-billion dollar media and
telecommunications joint ventures, including MCI and News Corp., Microsoft and NBC,
Nynex Corp. and Viacom, US West and Time Warner, and Sprint and TCI. Farhi, supra
note 26, at HI ("When it comes to the media business, it's a small, small world and
getting smaller all the time.").
233. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text (explaining that many commenta-
tors argue that large-scale media mergers threaten the diversity of voices in the media).
234. Compare Pearl, supra note 18, at A10 (comments of Steve Sunshine, former
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for mergers in the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, argu-
ing against including social and political concerns in the antitrust analysis) ("It may be
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At the center of this controversy are contrasting -concerns in the
legislative history surrounding the Celler-Kefauver Amendment and
the actual language of Section 7 regarding the role of non-econom-
ic factors in the antitrust analysis.235 While the legislative history
of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment emphasizes the social and polit-
ical effects that would result from an unbridled accumulation of
economic and political power within our country,236 the actual stat-
utory language of Section 7 does not refer to any such consider-
ations.237 This distinction has led to two conflicting approaches to
merger enforcement policy:238  the Chicago School Approach and
the Multivalued Approach.239
a. The Chicago School Approach
The first approach, known as the Chicago School, advocates a
that having a few large companies in the media business is bad social policy when under
standard antitrust principles it's not.") and Victor, supra note 227, at 118 (former FTC
Chairman, James C. Miller III, commenting that "[the FTC] ought to examine [the Time
Warner-TBS merger] and make a decision based strictly within the four squares of the
antitrust law and whether this merger would restrict competition ....") with id. (former
FCC general counsel, Henry Geller, arguing that "[media] does require special and height-
ened [antitrust] scrutiny-for economic reasons but also for reasons dealing with the
quality of life in a democracy").
235. Symposium, supra note 227 at 432 (comments of Joffe); Cann, supra note 226,
at 273-74; Panel Discussion: Merger Enforcement and Practice, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 233,
239 (1982) (comments of Robert D. Joffe, Member, New York Bar); Lawrence Sullivan,
Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Relationships,. 68
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1980); see Pitofsky, supra note 105, at 1051 (arguing that the issue
that separates differing schools for antitrust policy is whether non-economic considerations
have any role in the antitrust analysis, and if so, how they should be defined and mea-
sured).
236. See discussion supra part I.B. 1 (explaining that Congress feared an accelerated
concentration of corporate power not only on economic grounds, but also because of the
threat to other values a trend toward concentration was thought to pose).
237. See Can, supra note 226, at 274 (noting that Section 7, on its face, "only
prohibits those mergers where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly"); see also 15 U.S.C. § 18.
238. Cann, supra note 226, at 275; Panel Discussion: Merger Enforcement and
Practice, supra note 235, at 239 (comments of Joffe) (arguing that divergence in the
congressional record and the language of Section 7 led to the differing approaches to
antitrust enforcement).
239. Symposium, supra note 227, at 432 (comments of Joffe) (explaining the differ-
ences between Chicago School and Multivalued approaches).
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purely economic approach to the antitrust analysis by disregarding
the guidance in the congressional record and, instead, focusing
solely on the actual statutory language of Section 7.240
According to the Chicago School, "the major goals of antitrust
relate to economic efficiency-to avoid the allocative inefficiencies
of monopoly power, encourage efficiency and progressiveness in
the use of resources, and perhaps, on fairness grounds, to maintain
price close to cost in order to minimize unnecessary and undesir-
able accumulations of private wealth. 24'
Thus, proponents of the Chicago School emphasize the potential
benefits that accompany merger activity, rather than stressing the
potential non-economic dangers of such transactions.242 These
proponents argue that merger policy should seek to encourage effi-
ciencies resulting from economies of scale, technological and prod-
uct-related synergy, superior management, coordinated research and
development, lower transportation and transaction costs, and the
reduction of excess capacity. 243
Ultimately, advocates of the Chicago School argue that the free
market should be permitted to regulate itself, and that the prima-
ry-if not exclusive-evil that antitrust jurisprudence is to protect
against is the creation or exercise of market power.244 Consequent-
240. Id.; Cann, supra note 226, at 28; Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of
Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 925 (1979); Pitofsky, supra note 105, at 1051;
-cf. Adams & Brock, supra note 17, at 258 (describing the "revisionist" vision, a form of
the Chicago School, as viewing most government intervention as counterproductive, and
placing its faith in the operation of natural economic laws to protect the consuming
public). The Chicago School approach was, in fact, officially used at one time by the
DOJ. See U.S. Dep't. Justice, Merger Guidelines § V (B) n.54 (1982). Two of the
leading Supreme Court decisions adopting the Chicago School rationale are United States
v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974), and United States v. Marine Bancorporation,
418 U.S. 602 (1974).
' 241. Pitofsky, supra note 105, at 1051.
242. Cann, supra note 226, at 284; Symposium, supra note 227 at 432 (comments
of Joffe); Panel Discussion: Merger Enforcement and Practice, supra note 235, at 238-39
(comments of Robert H. Bork, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit).
243. Cann, supra note 226, at 284; Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency
Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALF. L. REV. 1582, 1599-1601 (1983).
244. Adams & Brock, supra note 17, at 282; Cann, supra note 226, at 284; Sympo-
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ly, followers of the Chicago School argue that mergers should be
analyzed purely in terms of their economic impact, irrespective of
non-economic considerations.245
b. The Multivalued Approach
In contrast to the Chicago School approach, the Multivalued
Approach recognizes that in passing Section 7, and more particular-
ly the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendment, Congress squarely articu-
lated its desire to preserve a variety of social and political values
and to encourage an "economic way of life" 246 that was compatible
with those values.247 Based on the legislative history, many propo-
nents of the Multivalued Approach argue "that a merger policy that
fails to reflect social and political considerations would contravene
the congressional mandate. 248
sium, supra note 227, at 432 (comments of Joffe); Pitofsky, supra note 105, at 1051; see
John S. McGee, Why Not "Deregulation" for Antitrust?, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION
AND THE MARKET SYSTEM: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES
53, 61 (1st ed. 1979) (arguing that if consumers are willing to purchase the goods offered
to them in the market, they are getting what they want, and their welfare is being maxi-
mized).
245. Adams & Brock, supra note 17, at 282; Cann, supra note 226, at 284; RICHARD
A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 20 (1976); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1703 (1986); Robert H.
Bork, Legislative Interest and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 47 (1966).
246. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 333 (explaining that Congress was concerned not only
with the anticompetitive economic effects of mergers, but also with the adverse social
ramifications that mergers may cause).
247. Carn, supra note 226, at 277. According to Judge Hand, evidence of Congres-
sional intent to expand the antitrust analysis beyond mere economics dates as far back as
1890, with the passing of the Sherman Act. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 427-
29.
248. See Can, supra note 226, at 280. According to Robert Pitofsky, "[it is bad
history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude political values in interpreting the antitrust
law." Pitofsky, supra note 105, at 1051. Pitofsky reasons that:
[T]he trend toward use of an exclusively economic approach to antitrust analy-
sis excludes important political considerations that have in the past been seen
as relevant by Congress and the courts. Such considerations as the fear that
excessive concentration of economic power will foster antidemocratic political
pressures, the desire to reduce the range of private discretion by a few in order
to enhance individual freedom, and the fear that increased governmental intru-
sion will become necessary if the economy is dominated by the few, can and
should be feasibly incorporated into the antitrust equation. Although economic
concerns would remain paramount, to ignore these non-economic factors would
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As a general rule, the Multivalued Approach expands the
definition of "competition" beyond mere "prices, costs, and product
innovations, ' 249 to include a strong "socio-political" connotation.2s
Many proponents of the Multivalued Approach justify this broad-
ened definition by arguing that Congress wished to avoid not only
economic, but also social losses from mergers. 25 1 These proponents
maintain, for example, that Congress sought to protect small busi-
nesses,252 prevent the loss of communities' local economic indepen-
dence to large, absentee corporations,253 and preserve the social and
civic ties that bind communities together.254
Some proponents of the Multivalued Approach also argue
that Congress considered the danger to political institutions that
accelerated economic concentration threatened. 5 In addition, these
proponents suggest that a firm's political influence grows as a
function of its size, creating political economies of scale and reduc-
ing the number and diversity of political decision-makers. 6 There-
fore, Multivalued Approach advocates insist that political and social
concerns are an integral part of the antitrust analysis.257
be to ignore the bases of antitrust legislation and the political consensus by
which antitrust has been supported.
Id. at 1075. Mr. Pitofsky's article provides several examples of legislative and judicial
history that support his argument.
249. Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Eco-
nomics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 248 (1960).
250. Id.
251. Statement on Possible Legislation Relating to Mergers by Large Corporations:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983) (statement of Joseph Brodley, Professor,
Boston University School of Law).
252. 95 CONG. REC. 11,506 (1949); 96 CONG. REC. 16,503, 16,507 (1950).
253. 96 CONG. REC. at 16,444, 16,450, 16,452.
254. 95 CONG. REC. at 11,495 (comments of Rep. Bryson).
255. Id. at 11,486.
256. See Michael Pertschuk & Kenneth M. Davidson, What's Wrong with Conglom-
erate Mergers?, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 6, 10 (1979); Harlan M. Blake, Conglomerate
Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 555, 591-92 (1973).
257. See Cann, supra note 226, at 280; Lawrence Anthony Sullivan, Economics and
More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources for Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U.
PA. L. REV. 1214, 1232 (1977); Pitofsky, supra note 105, at 1051; Bok, supra note 249,
at 236.
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II. HISTORICAL APPLICATION OF SECTION 7 TO MEDIA MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS
It has been said that media and entertainment are industries "in
which antitrust concepts such as product market and cross-elasticity
of demand are exceptionally difficult to apply. ' 58 Much of this
difficulty is attributable to the ambiguity that is associated with
identifying competition between a particular media product "and
the other forms of entertainment and enlightenment available in the
community. ,219 Moreover, as technology accelerates and additional
channels for information multiply,as ) previous leading media anti-
258. National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
259. Id. at 204 (plaintiff challenged FCC's authority to promulgate rules for develop-
ment of nationwide over-the-air subscription television); see also id. (discussing an FCC
report, 15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968), which suggests various product market definitions for the
media industry).
260. In addition to "older media," such as print, motion pictures, radio, and broadcast
television, recent developments in "new media" include satellite master antenna television
systems (SMATVs), multi-channel, multi-point. distribution systems (MMDS), direct
broadcast satellites (DBS), and home satellite dishes (HSDs). See Werner, supra note
160, at 224 n.32.
Other recent developments in new media and telecommunications include: (1) real-
time document/application sharing, which permits people in separate locations to share
graphics, text, and annotations while simultaneously speaking over the same standard
analog telephone line; and (2) the videoserver, which is the technology behind video-on-
demand and the "Cinema of the Future"-specially equipped theaters and venues that will
have the high-capacity and high-performance storage needed to deliver high-definition,
digitized versions of first-run films and live sports over a fiber-optic network. Patrick
Flanagan, The 10 Hottest Technologies in Telecom: A Market Research Perspective,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, May, 1995.
Finally, the media industry has experienced a recent surge in computerized informa-
tion services. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 230(a)(1), 110
Stat. 56, 141 (1996) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1)) (finding that "the rapidly
developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services available to individual
Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and
informational resources"); id., 110 Stat. at 59-60 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. .§
153(a)(41)) (defining "information service" as "the offering of a capability for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not
include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a
telecommunications system .or the management of a telecommunications service"); id.,
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trust cases no longer reflect market realities accurately. 26' Conse-
quently, antitrust analysis of the media industry has historically
been a particularly challenging area for both the courts and en-
forcement agencies. 262
This part examines the historical application of Section 7 to
media mergers and acquisitions. In particular, it focuses on a con-
sumer's ability to substitute media and how courts have defined the
product market for four media sub-categories: newspapers, motion
pictures, television, and radio.
A. Newspaper Industry
Since the 1940s, there have been numerous federal cases in-
volving the application of antitrust law in actions by or against the
publishers of newspapers or other periodicals.263 Of these cases,
110 Stat. at 142 (to be codified at § 230(e)(1)) (defining "Internet" as "the international
computer network of both federal and non-federal interoperable packet switched data
networks"); id., 110 Stat. at 142 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2)) (defining "inter-
active computer service" as "any information service, system, or access software provider
that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems
operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions"); id., 110 Stat. at 142
(to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3)) (defining "information content provider" as "any
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development
of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service").
261. Cf. United States v. Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining that
the development of technology rendered obsolete the Supreme Court's 1948 decision in
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948)); see also Pearl, supra note 18,
at A1O (arguing that while antitrust law does allow antitrust regulators to take into ac-
count where markets are heading, it is difficult to discern where the media industry is
,heading, given all the rapid changes in communications).
262. See Boadwee, supra note 149, at 1210. For example, over the past twenty
years, the FCC has purported that all information and entertainment media are reasonable
-substitutes, which consumers consider interchangeable. Id. (citations omitted). Under the
FCC's definition, all information and entertainment media would constitute a single
product market. Id.
Similarly, in his dissent in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours, also known
as the "Cellophane" case, Chief Justice Warren argued that the majority's definition of
a relevant product market, in that particular case, would enable a monopolist of motion
picture exhibition to "avoid Sherman Act consequences by showing that motion pictures
compete in substantial measure with legitimate theatre, television, radio, sporting events,
and other forms of entertainment." 351 U.S. 377, 423 (1956) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
263. See, e.g., Citizen Publ. Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); Albrecht v.
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however, only a few have involved the question of whether an
acquisition by one newspaper of a competing newspaper violated
Section 7.26 Nonetheless, courts ruling in both Clayton Act and
Sherman Act cases265 have held nearly uniformly against including
other forms of media, such as radio and television, in the relevant
product market definition for the newspaper antitrust analysis.266
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); ADVO v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191
(3d Cir. 1995); High Technology Careers v. San Jose Mercury News, 996 F.2d 987 (9th
Cir. 1993); Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355 (8th Cir. 1989); see also D. E. Evins,
Annotation, Federal Antitrust Act as Applied to Publishers of Newspapers or Other
Periodicals-Federal Cases, 19 L. Ed.2d 1530, 1533 (1968) (explaining that since 1945,
there have been many newspaper antitrust cases).
264. See, e.g., Citizen Publ. Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); Sun Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Omaha World-Herald Co., 713 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1983); C.A. Page Publ. Co.
v. Telford Work, 290 F.2d 334 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961); see also
Evins, supra note 263, at 1533-34. For example, of the eight Supreme Court cases that
involve newspapers and other periodicals, six focus on Sherman Act violations. See, e.g.,
United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549 (1971) (Clayton and Sherman
Acts) (printing of comic supplements); Citizens Publ. Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131
(1969) (Clayton and Sherman Acts); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)
(Sherman Act); Times-Picayune Publ. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (Sherman
Act); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (Sherman Act) (newspaper
and radio station); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (Sherman Act);
Indiana Farmer's Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934)
(Sherman Act); Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publ. Co., 252 U.S. 436
(1920) (Sherman Act).
265. United States v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400, 1402 (S.D.
Iowa 1991) ("The legal standards for an antitrust evaluation of an acquisition or merger
are substantially the same under both the Clayton and Sherman Acts."); see also Brown
Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (applying Sherman Act product market
to Clayton Act claims).
266. See, e.g., Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 695 F.2d 322, 326 n.4 (8th Cir.
1982) (affirming district court's conclusion that media, such as suburban newspapers,
shoppers' guides, handbills, news magazines, television, and radio, are sufficiently differ-
ent in purpose, content, technique, and audience appeal from metropolitan newspapers
sold at wholesale to constitute a separate product market), different results reached on
reh'g, 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 872 (1984); Morning Pioneer, Inc.
v. Bismark Tribune Co., 493 F.2d 383, 386 (8th Cir.) (finding that electronic media, such
as television and radio, do compete with daily newspapers in the news and advertising
fields, but that such media are not wholly competitive with respect to some types of news
and advertising), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); Buffalo Courier-Express, Inc. v.
Buffalo Evening News, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 628, 635-36 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (rejecting the
argument that the relevant product market, daily metropolitan newspapers, should be
broadened to include radio and television), rev'd on other grounds, 601 F.2d 48 (2d Cir.
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As authority for excluding other media from the relevant market,
26721many courts, including one from 1995,268 have looked to United
1979); United States v. Citizen Publ. Co., 280 F. Supp. 978, 986-87, 993 (D. Ariz. 1968)
(holding that relevant product market was the daily newspaper business, where: (1) daily
newspapers were the only media in the relevant geographic market that provided, on a
daily basis, such things as local society news, schedules of current local events, reports
of births and deaths, movie schedules, and box scores of local baseball games; (2) daily
newspapers, weekly newspapers, radio, television, and magazines all supplied news and
advertising content to the public; (3) only daily newspapers, radio, and television provided
extensive coverage of local, state, national, and international news on a daily basis; (4)
radio and television neither attempted to nor generally succeeded in reporting news with
the same depth of coverage as daily newspapers; (5) "a newspaper may be picked up and
read at the convenience of the reader, whereas the news broadcast by radio or television
stations [could] only be heard if the set [was] on at the particular time that the station
[was] broadcasting it"; (6) "newspapers constitute[d] a permanent record of news and
information; broadcast news [was], by its very nature, transitory"; (7) of the media in
Citizen Publishing, newspapers were primarily news-oriented, whereas radio and television
were primarily entertainment-oriented; and (8) newspapers could not duplicate television
and radio's "on-the-spot" coverage of news and sporting events), aff'd, 394 U.S. 131
(1969); see also Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 600, 611, 613 (discussing competition for
advertising among newspapers and other communications media, such as radio, television,
and magazines); infra note 268 (discussing the differences between local, metropolitan,
and regional newspapers).
267. See, e.g., Morning Pioneer, 493 F.2d at 386; Buffalo Courier-Express, 441 F.
Supp. at 636; Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 1346, 1366 (N.D. Cal. 1974),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910
(1977); Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 651, 675 n.56 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 522 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936
(1976); McKeon Constr. v. McClatchy Newspapers, 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,212, at
88,816 (D. Cal. Nov. 24, 1969); see also Keith Roberts, Antitrust Problems in the News-
paper Industry, 82 HARV. L. REV. 319, 320-22 (1968),
268. See Community Publishers v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146, 1157 (W.D.
Ark. 1995) (decided on June 30, 1995). In Community Publishers, the government and
private plaintiffs successfully challenged the purchase of a local daily newspaper, the
Northwest Arkansas Times ("the Times"), by NAT, L.C. ("NAT"), which had significant
shareholders in common with co-defendant Donrey Media Group ("Donrey"), owner of
the Morning News of Northwest Arkansas ("Morning News"), a competing local daily
newspaper. Id. at 1148. In finding the product market for readership to be local daily
newspapers, the Community Publishers court explained why other mass media should be
excluded from the relevant market definition:
The local daily newspaper provides a unique package of information to its
readers. Foremost, it provides national, state and local news. Many of the
stories, such as those on high school sports and city council meetings, are of
purely local interest. Readers also value other features of a local nature, includ-
ing calendars of local events and meetings, movie and TV listings, classified
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States v. Times Mirror Company,269 a district court decision that
was decided in 1967.270
In Times Mirror, the government challenged the $15 million271
acquisition by the publisher of the largest daily newspaper in
Southern California (the Los Angeles Times) of the largest indepen-
dent 272 daily newspaper publisher in Southern California (The Sun
Company). 273 The acquiring company, Times Mirror, was a highly
diversified holding company with large interests in newspaper pub-
lishing, book publishing, and commercial printing.274 Between
1960 and 1964, the earnings after taxes of the Times Mirror Com-
advertisements, other local advertising, legal notices, and obituaries. The format
of the newspaper allows its message to be timely and detailed. Moreover, a
newspaper is portable and allows readers access to information at their own
convenience.
The peculiar characteristics and uses of other media outlets are completely
different. National and state newspapers have a similar format to local papers,
but they contain no local news or advertising, which is a critical factor in the
acceptance and success of a local daily .... On the other hand, weekly papers
offer purely local news, and as weeklies, they offer virtually no time sensitivity.
Radio and television news are also poor substitutes for local papers. Television
and radio are primarily dedicated to entertainment, and to the extent that they
offer news and information, they lack breadth and depth of coverage. Also,
they are not portable and convenient like newspapers.
Id. at 1155.
269. 274 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 712 (1968).
270. Prior to Times Mirror, there were at least two antitrust cases that considered the
interchangeability of newspapers with television and radio in certain circumstances. See
Times-Picayne Publ. Co., 345 U.S. at 600 (Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act) (sug-
gesting that competition exists, in certain circumstances, between newspapers, magazines,
radio, and television for advertising linage); News, Inc. v. Lindsay Newspapers, Inc., 1962
Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,398, at 76,621 (S.D. Fla. June 7, 1962) (Sherman and Clayton
Acts) (finding competition among weekly newspapers, visitors' guides, radio, and televi-
sion). Nevertheless, both of these cases focus on the substitutability of media for the
advertising market. Times-Picayne Publ. Co., 345 U.S. at 600; News, Inc., 1962 Trade
Cas. (CCH) at 76,620. This Note, in contrast, only considers media substitutability in the
eyes of the consumer.
271. Times Mirror, 274 F. Supp. at 611.
272. A newspaper is independently owned when its owners do not publish another
newspaper at another locality. Id. at 621.
273. Id. at 609. The Los Angeles Times, which was owned by Times Mirror, had the
largest circulation of daily newspapers in California for the twenty years prior to the
acquisition, and the largest Sunday circulation for the prior fifteen years. id.
274. Id.
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pany had more than doubled, its total assets had increased from
$81 million to $165 million, and its revenues had risen from $113
million to $197 million.275 The company's principal enterprise, the
Los Angeles Times,276 was "a newspaper with special focus on the
interpretation of news and issues and specialization in financial
news, entertainment, art, sports and special interest subjects. 277 In
terms of circulation, the Los Angeles Times was the largest daily
newspaper published in California for the prior 19 years and the
largest Sunday paper in California for the prior 16 years.278 In
addition, it led all others nationwide in total annual daily and Sun-
day advertising lineage279 for the prior 12 years, and in total annual
editorial and feature matter lineage for the prior 16 years.280
In contrast, the acquired company, the Sun Company, with its
three newspapers, the morning Sun, the evening Telegram, and the
Sunday Sun-Telegram, dominated the daily newspaper business in
California's San Bernardino County.281 Both the morning Sun and
the Sunday Sun-Telegram carried a substantial amount of state,
national, and international news, complete stock reports of the New
York and American Stock Exchanges, national sports news, nation-
ally known columnists, comics and other syndicated features, and
Los Angeles television and radio logs. 282
In analyzing the government's claim that the combined Times
Mirror and Sun Company violated Section 7, the court's first step
was to develop the relevant market definition.283 Regarding the
275. Id. A large part of the growth of the Times Mirror Company had been attribut-
able to a number of acquisitions. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 610.
278. Id. at 609-10.
279. "Advertising lineage" is defined as "(1) the number of printed lines, especially
agate lines, covered by a magazine article, newspaper advertisement, etc., or (2) the
amount charged, paid, or received per printed line, as of a magazine article or short
story." RANDOM HOUSE DICIONARY OF THE ENG. LANGUAGE 1116 (2d ed. 1987).
280. Times Mirror, 274 F. Supp. at 609.
281. Id. at 610. San Bernardino County adjoins Los Angeles County to the east.
Id.
282. Id.
283. See id. at 614 ("a finding of the appropriate 'product market' is a necessary
predicate to a determination of whether a merger has the requisite anticompetitive ef-
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product market, the court held that the daily newspaper 'business
was a distinct line of commerce,1 4 based on a number of peculiar
characteristics and uses that made it distinguishable from all other
products.285 According to the court, the daily newspaper had
achieved industry and public recognition and utilized unique meth-
fects") (citing Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 324).
284. The Times Mirror court also classified daily newspapers into three categories:
(1) community or local; (2) metropolitan; and (3) regional. Times Mirror, 274 F. Supp.
at 614. The court described a local paper as one which serves its own community, by
emphasizing local news, local issues, and advertising. Id. ("Although each community
daily likes to think of itself as a primary newspaper, basically it will have a skeleton of
national and international news from press associations which vary little from paper to
paper."); see also id. (defining a "primary paper" as "one which gives to its reader all the
news and information he [or she] needs to be an informed person"). Such newspapers are
also "newspapers of record for their communities, reporting births, deaths, marriages,
social events and the like." Id. In contrast, the Times Mirror court defined a metropoli-
tan paper as one which serves "a metropolitan complex which is an area of population
concentration that has in it a number of communities." Id. (explaining that the New York
Times, the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times are examples of metropolitan
papers). Metropolitan papers emphasize the development in detail of "national, interna-
tional, regional and state news and, thus, seek out the news that is of interest to the
greatest number of readers rather than attempt to do a systematic job of covering the news
of all the small communities within the metropolitan complex." Id. But see id. (noting
a trend that had recently begun to develop in the newspaper industry, in which metropoli-
tan papers established zone editions, featuring local news, social events, and advertising
of the communities within the particular zone, in order to increase circulation and adver-
tising in the smaller communities). Finally, the Times Mirror court explained that a
regional newspaper is one which "serves a vast region in a systematic way. Such a paper
is usually found in areas that are to some degree still rural in character. It carries local
news of its major community and, extensively and systematically, local news of the
smaller communities in the region." Id. (explaining that examples of regional newspapers
included the Sacramento Bee, which served Northern and Central California; the Salt Lake
Tribune, which served all of Utah and part of Idaho, Wyoming and Nevada; and the Des
Moines Morning Register, which covered all of Iowa and part of Nebraska and South
Dakota, bypassing larger communities like Iowa City and Cedar Rapids). Despite the
above analysis, however, the Times Mirror court ultimately held that while the Los Angel-
es Times and the Sun were complementary products, rather than competing products (the
Sun was somewhat more locally-oriented toward the relevant geographic market of San
Bernardino County than the Los Angeles Times was), this distinction was not significant
enough in the instant case to warrant placing the two papers in separate product markets.
See id. at 615-17. Specifically, the court held that it made "little difference when one
newspaper acquires another what the merger is called, whether it be horizontal or product-
extension. The issue is whether the effect is to substantially lessen competition in any
section of the country." id. at 616.
285. Id. at 617.
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ods of production, distribution, and pricing-all practical indicia for
determining a product market.286 In particular, the court empha-
sized the fact that the daily newspaper provided a cluster of servic-
es in one unique package, 287 and that the business had its own trade
288 2899associations, societies,  and journals.29  In determining the
product market, the Times Mirror court also recognized that while
daily newspapers compete with other media, such as radio and
television, for both news and advertising, "all competitors of any
service provided by a daily newspaper should not be lumped into
the same line of commerce with it."' 291  The court reasoned that
while substitutes may exist for every product, "a relevant market
cannot meaningfully encompass that infinite range. 292 In the final
analysis, the Times Mirror court regarded the daily newspaper
business as a commercial reality which was "universally recognized
as a line of commerce. 293
Just as the court considered practical indicia and market reali-
ties in determining the product market, it also incorporated such
characteristics in defining San Bernardino County as the relevant
geographic market.294 First, the court stressed that the county en-
compassed virtually the entire area of circulation and home deliv-
286. Id.
287. Id. These services included "a daily written record of current events and refer-
ence information including vital statistics, public announcements, legal notices, box
scores, stock market reports, weather reports, theater listings and radio and television
logs." Id.
288. Id. One example of a daily newspaper trade association is the American News-
paper Publishers Association. Id.
289. Id. The American Society of Newspaper Editors is one such society. Id.
290. Id. Editor and Publisher is one such trade journal. Id. The Journal reports
statistics and records relating only to the daily newspaper business. Id.
291. Id. at 618.
292. Id. (quoting United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 449 (1964)).
293. Id. at 617.
294. See id. (utilizing industry characteristics in developing the product market); id.
at 619-20 (utilizing similar characteristics in delineating the geographic market). In
determining the relevant geographic market, courts often factor in the area of a certain
periodical's circulation. See, e.g., Citizens Publ. Co., 394 U.S. at 135 (holding that Pima
County, Arizona, had the proper geographic market for a merger of the only two local
newspapers in Tucson); Morning Pioneer, 493 F.2d at 385 (holding that the relevant
geographic market for two local newspapers was the southwestern North Dakota area).
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ery overlap between the Los Angeles Times and the Sun.29 5 Second,
the court stated that the newspaper industry recognized San
Bernardino County as a single newspaper market.2 96  Third, the
court noted that both the Sun Company and Times Mirror had
recognized San Bernardino County as a daily newspaper market for
years, and had regularly reported for advertisers' use such things
as circulation, number of households, population, and retail sales
on a San Bernardino basis. 297 Finally, and most importantly, the
court found that Times Mirror, itself, in evaluating the acquisition
of the Sun, had used the daily newspaper business in San
Bernardino County as the relevant market area.298 As a result, the
court held that San Bernardino County constituted the relevant
geographic market for the acquisition in question.2"
The second step of the court's Section 7 analysis was to scruti-
nize the trend toward concentration in the daily newspaper indus-
try.3 ° In its inquiry, the court examined the trend not only in the
relevant market of San Bernardino County, but also in the larger
area of Southern California, where the Los Angeles Times circu-
295. Times Mirror, 274 F. Supp. at 619. Specifically, in 1964, the year of the
acquisition, the Los Angeles Times had a weekday circulation of 16,650 and a Sunday
circulation of 31,993 within San Bernardino County. Id. This amounted to 11 percent
of the total weekday circulation for both morning and evening newspapers in the county,
24 percent of total morning circulation, and 20 percent of the total Sunday circulation.
Id. In contrast, the Sun had its entire circulation, except for a very few copies, within the
limits of San Bernardino County. id.
296. Id. In making this determination, the court looked to organizations such as the
Audit Bureau of Circulations, the American Newspapers Market, Inc., and Standard Rate
& Data Service. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. The defendant in this case contended that the county of San Bernardino was
not commercially realistic because county lines define political and administrative limits,
not the boundaries of a newspaper market. Id. Also, the Times Mirror Company argued
that the largest part of its circulation was in the western part of San Bernardino County,
while the largest part of the circulation of the Sun was in the eastern part. Id. In re-
sponse to these arguments, the Times Mirror court held that while counties generally are
only political and administrative boundaries, the entire county still constituted the relevant
geographic market in this case, because of commercial indicia and Times Mirror's own
pre-acquisition analyses. Id.
300. id. at 620.
[Vol. 6:781
MULTIMEDIA MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
lates.3°' Ultimately, the Times Mirror court found that there had
been a steady decline of independent ownership of newspapers in
Southern California,3° and that at the time of the acquisition there
was already a heavy concentration of daily newspaper ownership
in Los Angeles County and the four counties immediately sur-
rounding it.303
In its third and final step, the Times Mirror court analyzed the
industry trend toward concentration, in conjunction with other in-
dustry- and transaction-specific factors, to determine the likely
anticompetitive effects of a combined Times Mirror-Sun Compa-
ny.304 Specifically, the court found that the acquisition would en-
hance existing barriers to entry and increase the difficulties of
smaller firms already in the market, because the Southern Califor-
nia daily newspaper market was already significantly difficult to
enter. 5 Consequently, the court ruled that the acquisition and
ownership of stock of the Sun Company by the defendant, the
Times Mirror Company, violated Section 7, and directed the defen-
dant to divest itself of the Sun Company's stock, accordingly.3°
301. Id. at 621. As authority for examining the trend toward concentration beyond
the relevant market, the Times Mirror court looked to United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank. Id. (citing 374 U.S. 321, 325-26 (1963)). In Philadelphia National Bank,
the Supreme Court determined that the relevant geographic market was the metropolitan
area consisting of Philadelphia and its three contiguous counties. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. at 325-26, cited in Times Mirror, 274 F. Supp. at 621. Yet in discussing
the trend toward concentration in the commercial banking business (the relevant product
market), the Philadelphia National Bank court extensively discussed the trend throughout
the United States, an area far outside the relevant geographic market. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. at 325-26, cited in Times Mirror, 274 F. Supp. at 621.
302. Times Mirror, 274 F. Supp. at 621. As of January 1, 1952, six of the seven
daily newspapers in San Bernardino County were independently owned. id. On Decem-
ber 31, 1966, only three of the eight dailies published there remained independent. id.
303. Id. For example, the top four American newspaper publishers accounted for 73
percent of all weekday daily circulation, while the top ten publishers accounted for 89
percent of the total. Id. The Los Angeles Times, alone, accounted for 80 percent of all
morning daily circulation in the five-county area. Id.
304. Id. at 622.
305. Id. As evidence, the court pointed to the then recent failure of the New York
Times, one of the most powerful publishers in the country, to successfully establish a
West Coast edition. Id.
306. Id. at 624.
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B. Motion Picture Industry
In addition to mergers and acquisitions among newspaper com-
panies, courts have also considered the substitutability of media in
deciding antitrust cases concerning the motion picture industry.3 °
Due to changes in technology and judicial oversight, ° competition
with and within the motion picture industry3°9 has broadened dra-
matically since leading decisions, such as United States v. Para-
mount Pictures,31° were handed down decades ago.3 Consequent-
ly, motion picture antitrust cases today stand in stark contrast to the
leading cases of years past.
307. See, e.g., United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 666-67 n.9 (9th Cir.
1990) (movie exhibition market) (suggesting that moviegoers view first-run theatrical
exhibition substitutable with exhibition on home video, cable television and pay-per-view
television); United States v. Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d 29, 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1989) (movie
exhibition market) (explaining that movie theatres, network television, syndicated televi-
sion, cable television, and videocassettes exhibit competing forms of movies); United
States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (movie produc-
tion market) (explaining that consumers see motion pictures substitutable with other forms
of entertainment); see infra notes 346-49 and accompanying text (explaining that the
movie industry is divided into three markets: production, distribution, and exhibition).
308. One aspect of judicial oversight of the motion picture industry that has changed
in the past few years is the recent approval by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals of
vertical integration of the movie industry. See, e.g.,United States v. Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d
29 (2d Cir. 1989); see also infra notes 351-62 and accompanying text (discussing the
Paramount Pictures and Loew's Inc. decisions).
309. As opposed to 40 years ago, the motion picture industry today faces stiffer
competition from ancillary markets, including: network television, syndicated, cable, and
pay-per-view television, and home video. United States v. Syufy Enters., 712 F. Supp.
1386, 1396 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990); Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d
at 33 (using the term "aftermarkets" instead of "ancillary markets"). "Ancillary markets"
are defined as "the distribution of motion pictures to home video, cable television, and
pay-per-view television." Syufy, 712 F. Supp. at 1389 n.3.
310. 334 U.S. 131 (1948); see infra notes 351-62 and accompanying text (discussing
the Paramount Pictures case in detail).
311. See, e.g., Syufy, 712 F. Supp. at 1397 ("The advent of vast and rapid technologi-
cal changes in the industry resulting in substantial nontheatrical exhibition requires the
Court to reassess the validity of [the Paramount Pictures Court's decision to limit] the
product market to first-run exhibits.").
312. Compare id. at 1389 (defining the product market for the motion picture indus-
try broadly) and Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d at 33 (recognizing that first-run films compete
with motion picture aftermarkets) with Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 170-71 (defining
the product market narrowly) and Houser v. Fox Theatres Management Corp., 845 F.2d
1225, 1229-30 (3d Cir. 1988) (defining the product market narrowly) and Admiral Theatre
[Vol. 6:781
MULTIMEDIA MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
Of the recent antitrust cases that recognize the depth of compe-
tition that the movie industry faces, the district court's decision in
United States v. Syufy Enterprises313 is one particularly instructive
Section 7 analysis. In Syufy, the defendant, Syufy Enterprises
("Syufy"), 314 was a regional motion picture theatre circuit 15 that, in
1985, operated a total of 33 indoor theatres with approximately 130
screens and 23 drive-in theatres with approximately 108 screens in
California, Nevada, and several other western states.316 The gov-
ernment alleged that Syufy's acquisition of a competing exhibitor,
Red Rock Theatre, and plans to construct a 12 screen theatre, sub-
stantially lessened competition in one particular market-Las Ve-
gas, Nevada. 317 The market for first-run exhibition of motion pic-
tures in Las Vegas evolved as follows: 318
FIGURE 1
NUMBER OF SCREENS
Dec. 1980 Jan. 1981 Jan. 1983
Plitt Theatres: 3 3 0
Mann Theatres: 3 3 0
Red Rock Theatre: 11 11 11
Syufy Enterprises: 0 6 12
Roberts Company: 0 0 5
Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 437 F. Supp. 1268, 1299 (D. Neb. 1977), aff'd, 585 F.2d
877 (8th Cir. 1978) (defining the product market narrowly).
313. 712 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aft'd, 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990). The
government, in Syufy, also claimed that the defendant violated the Sherman Act. Id. at
1387. Nevertheless, this Note focuses on violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and,
consequently, will not explore Sherman Act allegations.
314. Actually, there were two defendants in the case, Raymond Syufy and Syufy
Enterprises. id. Raymond Syufy was the general partner of Syufy Enterprises, a limited
partnership which had its principal place of business in San Francisco, California. Id.
315. There are essentially two types of movie theatres: "circuits" and "indepen-
dents." See Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir.
1982) (private Sherman Act action brought by movie theatre owner against competing
theatre chains and national film distributors alleging conspiracy to deprive owner of
opportunity to license first-run films). Circuits are chains of theatres under common
ownership, while independent theatres are individuals unaffiliated with any circuit. Id.
316. Syufy, 712 F. Supp. at 1387.
317. Id. at 1395, 1404.
318. Id. at 1389-92.
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SYUFY ROBERTS/UA
Number of Market Number of Market
Screens Share Screens Share
1984: 23 60% 5 40%
1985: 23 91% 11 9%
1986: 23 85% 28 15%
1987 (1st half): 23 79% 28 21%
1987 (2nd half): 23 57% 31 24%
1988 (1st half): 22 39% 31 25%
1989 (proposed): 34 - 31
In determining whether the above trend toward consolidation
rose to the level of a Section 7 violation, the Syufy court first ana-
lyzed the relevant market.3 9 Because both parties stipulated that
the City of Las Vegas was the appropriate geographic market,320 the
court focused on the scope of the relevant product market.32' The
government contended that the product market should include only
first-run exhibitions of motion pictures,322 and that a line of cases,
originating with the Paramount Pictures case, routinely accepted
such a narrow definition.323 Notwithstanding such authority, the
court held that the rapid development of technology warranted an
expansion of the product market beyond first-run exhibits to in-
clude sub-run exhibits, as well as exhibition in the ancillary mar-
kets324 of home video, cable television, and pay-per-view, televi-
sion.325
319. See id. at 1389, 1396-1400.
320. Id. at 1396-97.
321. Id. at 1397.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 1396 (citing Fox Theatres, 845 F.2d at 1229-30); Admiral Theatre Corp.,
437 F. Supp. at 1299; see also infra notes 351-62 and accompanying text (discussing the
Paramount Pictures decision in detail).
324. See supra note 309 (defining "ancillary markets").
325. Syufy, 712 F. Supp. at 1396. At least one commentator has argued that movies
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In finding that consumers consider home video, cable televi-
sion, sub-run exhibition and, to a lesser degree, pay-per-view tele-
vision viable substitutes to first-run theatrical exhibition, the Syufy
court emphasized four main points. 326 First, the defendant had
introduced evidence that 50 percent of VCR owners attend movie
theatres less often and that 67 percent of VCR owners prefer
watching a movie at home instead of at a theatre.327 Second, the
defendant had established that persons who subscribe to pay cable
television also go to the movies less. 328 Third, the court found that
consumers viewed the above ancillary markets-VCR and cable
television-as substitutes to first-run motion picture exhibition.329
Finally, the expert testimony at trial proved that home video and
cable television alternatives act as a restraint to theatre exhibitors'
ability to charge excessive prices at the box office. 330 As a result,
the court found that if the defendant were to raise its admission
prices, many consumers simply would not go to one of its theatres
to see a movie.331 Instead, such consumers would likely rent a
movie on videocassette or watch a movie on cable television.332
Thus, the court held that the product market for the movie industry,
insofar as consumers are concerned, should be defined broadly to
include all ancillary markets.333
appearing on different media compete, because they are of the same "program type." See
Boadwee, supra note 149, at 1224. But see id. (rejecting an approach for defining prod-
uct markets for video programming that is based exclusively on program types). A
"program" is a coherent sequence of video or audio information, communicated over a
medium that primarily transmits such information. Id. at 1211 (citing Cable Communica-
tions Policy Act of 1984, § 602(16), 47 U.S.C. § 522(16) (1994)). A "program type" is
"a group of programs set apart by similarities in format, length, or content, such that
viewers consider them reasonably substitutable." Id.
326. See Syufy, 712 F. Supp. at 1399.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. ld.
333. Id. The district court in Syufy also defined the product market from the per-
spective of distributors, and determined that it should also include all ancillary markets.
Id. On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the government that such a defini-
tion does not accurately reflect the defendant's power over film distributors. 903 F.2d at
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Having defined the relevant market, the Syufy court next set out
to estimate the defendant's strength in that market. As Figure 1
demonstrates,334 Syufy had a significant, albeit steadily declining,
market share throughout the 1980s. Notwithstanding such percent-
ages, the court held that Syufy's acquisitions and internal expan-
sions did not pose a significant likelihood of lessening competition
in Las Vegas.335 Specifically, the court found that this case was a
prime example of one in which there were no barriers to entry and,
consequently, no monopoly power.336 As evidence, the court
looked to the Roberts Company, the only other significant com-
petitor to Syufy, which had expanded the number of theatres it
operated in Las Vegas between November 1985 and December
1986 from five to twenty-eight screens.337
Supporting the court's determination was an economic expert
who had testified "convincingly" at trial that Roberts' great and
rapid expansion was proof that no entry barriers existed in Las
Vegas.338 Moreover, the fact that Syufy was planning to build
twelve more screens upon the conclusion of the trial was evidence
that the market could handle additional theatres. 339 Finally, project-
ing population growth and applying the industry standard that there
should be one screen for every ten thousand persons, the court
found that Las Vegas would be underscreened in the near future if
no additional screens were added.340 As a result, the Syufy court
held that additional competitors could enter the Las Vegas market
with no barriers.34' More importantly, the court found that the
defendant's acquisitions and internal expansions did not violate
665 n.9. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the product market definition with
respect to consumers, and held that the district court's erroneous definition of the relevant
upstream product market did not warrant reversal, because the court had made alternative
findings using the government's narrower market definition, limited solely to first-run
exhibition, that were supported by substantial evidence. Id.
334. See supra text accompanying note 318 (Figure 1).
335. Syufy, 712 F. Supp. at 1402-03.
336. Id. at 1401.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
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Section 7.342
Decisions such as Syufy are likely to stimulate mergers and
acquisitions within the motion picture industry, because diminished
antitrust merger concerns are likely to follow from broadened rele-
vant product market definitions.343 Nonetheless, this is not the only
path by which rapidly developing technology will lead to consoli-
dation within the movie industry.34 In contrast, the advent of tech-
nology, and the corresponding rise in motion picture aftermarkets,
has also lead to a lessening of judicial oversight of vertical integra-
tion within the motion picture industry.345
In broad terms, the movie industry encompasses three mar-
kets: 34 6 (1) production; 347 (2) distribution; 348 and (3) exhibition.349
342. Id. at 1403.
343. As a general rule, "a broadly defined product market will include a greater
number of competitors than a narrowly defined market" and, consequently, less market
power. Katherine B. Kravitz, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and Federal Antitrust Law:
The Quest For Compatibility, 15 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 539, 551 (1990); see also David L.
Kasserman & John W. Mayo, Competition and Asymmetric Regulation in Long-Distance
Telecommunications: An Assessment of the Evidence, 4 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 4
(1996); Andrew C. Hruska, A Broad Market Approach to Antitrust Product Market Defini-
tion in Innovative Industries, 102 YALE L.J. 305, 331 (1992).
344. See, e.g., David Einstein & Jeff Pelline, Disney's Stunning Deal to Buy ABC,
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 1, 1995, at Al ("Acquisitions and alliances [of entertainment compa-
nies] are being driven by new technologies that blur the boundaries between media and
entertainment."); Viacom Acquiring Larger Paramount, NEWSDAY, Sept. 13, 1993, at 8
("'he [consolidation trend in the media and entertainment industries] has been fueled by
the promise of technology that could soon make channels and an array of services avail-
able through TV sets.").
345. See, e.g., Dottie Enrico, Big Media Marriage Blessed By Boards, ENT. LMG.
REG., Oct. 9, 1989 (discussing Loew's Inc.); see generally Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d at 31,
33.
346. Syufy, 712 F. Supp. at 1387; see Southway Theatres, 672 F.2d at 488 (finding
a tripartite system of film production and marketing in the United States: production,
distribution, and exhibition); Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. at 1104 (finding that
"motion picture production, motion picture distribution, and motion picture exhibition are
each separate and distinct lines of commerce within the commercial realities of the motion
picture industries"); cf. Boadwee, supra note 149, at 1215 (explaining that video program-
ming has four markets: the advertising market, the program acquisition market, the
program distribution market, and the program exhibition market). This Note does not
consider the advertising market, because movies usually do not contain commercials.
347. Syufy, 712 F. Supp. at 1387. Production companies operate at the originating
level and "are responsible for the financing and creation-at least economically--of
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At one time, courts disapproved greatly of vertical integration of
these three markets. 350  For example, in the 1948 Paramount Pic-
tures decision, the Supreme Court found that the major motion
picture studios had unreasonably restrained competition in violation
of the Sherman Act35' by entering into certain anticompetitive
agreements with exhibitors by vertically integrating the production,
distribution, and exhibition of motion pictures.352
motion pictures." Southway Theatres, 672 F.2d at 487-88.
348. Syufy, 712 F. Supp. at 1387. Distributors market motion pictures to theatre
owners, who are known as exhibitors. Southway Theatres, 672 F.2d at 488. Motion
picture distributors market their films by licensing the right to exhibit them for a specified
period of time. Id.; see Syufy, 903 F.2d at 662 n. 1 (explaining that "film distributors..
. sell exhibition licenses"). The exhibitor rents a print of the film along with a copyright
license of limited duration. Southway Theatres, 672 F.2d at 488. Licensing agreements
generally provide for payment to the distributor of a percentage of the gross box office
profits earned by each exhibitor, and often also include a guaranteed minimum to be paid,
regardless of the success of the film. Id.; see Syufy, 903 F.2d at 662 n.1. Under this
system, the distributors retain a direct interest in the profitability of each picture, and they
carefully control the availability and distribution patterns of films so as to maximize
returns. Southway Theatres, 672 F.2d at 488.
The process of motion picture distribution does not stop, however, after films are
licensed to exhibitors for public theatrical exhibition. Syufy, 712 F. Supp. at 1388.
Thereafter, they are available in videocassette form for resale or rental for private, "home
video" use. Id. They are also licensed for exhibition on pay-per-view, cable, and broad-
cast television. Id.
In United States v. Columbia Pictures Corporation, an antitrust case involving films
sold for television exhibition, the term "distribution" was defined as:
Offering to grant and sublicensing, the right to televise any filmed, videotaped
or live programming to (1) any person operating any television station or group
of television stations, for televising over such station or group, (2) any sponsor
sponsoring any telecast'over any television station or (3) any advertising agen-
cy, for exercise on behalf of any client sponsoring telecast over any television
station.
189 F. Supp. 153, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
349. Syufy, 712 F. Supp. at 1387. "Exhibitor" is a technical term in the motion
picture industry that refers to the company that actually projects a motion picture for
viewing by the public in a cinema. Boadwee, supra note 149, at 1215 n.26.
350. Southway Theatres, 672 F.2d at 488; see, e.g., Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S.
131, 141 (1948).
351. The antitrust evaluation of an acquisition or merger is substantially the same
under both the Clayton and Sherman Acts. See Archer Daniels Midland, 781 F. Supp.
at 1402.
352. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 141; Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d at 30 (discussing
the Paramount Pictures decision). The Court explicitly stated, however, that vertical
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In the subsequent case history to Paramount Pictures, the mo-
tion picture studios were required to divest themselves of all mo-
tion picture theatres they then owned.353 Furthermore, in order to
terminate producers' anticompetitive practice of distributing films
exclusively to circuits of theatres, the studios were prohibited from
"licensing any feature for exhibition.., in any other manner than
that each license shall be offered and taken theatre by theatre, sole-
ly upon the merits and without discrimination in favor of affiliated
theatres, circuit theatres or others. 354 Finally, on remand from the
Paramount Pictures Court, the motion picture studios were also
prohibited from acquiring theatres in the exhibition business in the
future, except upon application to the U.S. Attorney General and
upon a showing to the court "that any such engagement shall not
unreasonably restrain competition in the distribution or exhibition
of motion pictures. 355
Despite the gradual evolution of the movie industry,356 the Par-
amount Pictures decision and its subsequent history were regarded
integration of producing, distributing and exhibiting motion pictures is not illegal per se.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 173-74 ("the legality of vertical integration under the
Sherman Act turns on: (1) the purpose or intent with which it was conceived, or (2) the
power it creates and the attendant purpose or intent").
353. United States v. Loew's Inc., 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,765, 64,273-74
(S.D.N.Y. 1951); see also Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 174-75 (remanding to the
district court the issue of whether divestiture is proper). The subsequent case history to
the Paramount Pictures decision proceeded under the name, Loew's Inc. Search of
LEXIS, Auto-cite service (May'20, 1996).
354. Loew's Inc., 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH), at 64,272. Today, motion picture
distributors frequently license films by competitive bidding. Southway Theatres, 672 F.2d
at 488. Under the competitive bidding system, exhibitors in a marketing area defined by
the distributor are asked to submit bids stating the percentages and guarantees each
exhibitor will pay for the film being offered. Id. The distributor selects the most lucra-
tive combination of bids. Id. If it is unsatisfied with some or all of the bids it has
received, it may enter into negotiations with individual exhibitors in the hopes of receiv-
ing a more profitable agreement. Id.
355. Loew's Inc., 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH), at 64,272; see Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d
at 30; see also Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 150-51 (affirming decision of lower
courts to enjoin future acquisitions).
356. See Southway Theatres, 672 F.2d at 498 (finding that the structure of the motion
picture industry has evolved since Paramount Pictures, with respect to a movie distribu-
tor's'ability to boycott an exhibitor).
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as the leading motion picture antitrust decision for many decades.357
Some 40 years later, however, in United States v. Loew's Inc., 358
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, finding that the growth of the
motion picture aftermarkets of videocassettes, network, and syndi-
cated and cable television had dramatically changed the nature and
business realities of the motion picture industry,359 lifted the Para-
mount Pictures consent judgment 360 and granted the movie produc-
er-distributor defendant permission to own and operate motion
picture theatres, subject to certain restrictions. 361 ' With the restric-
tions on vertical integration eliminated by the Second Circuit, it is
likely that motion picture production studios will look to acquire
or merge with distribution and exhibition firms.362
C. Television and Radio Industries
The debate over the substitutability of various media is not
limited to antitrust decisions concerning the newspaper and motion
picture industries. In contrast, the concept of interchangeability
also often arises in defining a relevant product market for antitrust
cases in the television and radio industries as well.363 For example,
357. Id. at 496.
358. 882 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1989).
359. Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d at 33. According to the Loew's Inc. court, "[tihere is
now at least one screen in most homes in the United States, many millions in addition to
the 22,000 screens owned by motion picture exhibitors." Id.
360. The consent judgment was issued on remand from the Paramount Pictures
Court by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. See
Loew's Inc., 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH), at 64,265.
361. Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d at 29. The restrictions included a prohibition of a return
to the sort of licensing arrangements that the consent judgment addressed and prohibited.
Id. at 34. Moreover, the defendant's competitors remained free to seek redress under the
antitrust laws if the defendant began to engage in anticompetitive activities. Id.
362. One example is Sony Corporation's vertical integration of movie production,
distribution, and exhibition since the 1989 Loew's Inc. decision. See, e.g., Sony Theatres
Deal Gives New Meaning to Movie Magic, CHI. TRIBUNE, May 25, 1995, at N2; Alan
Citron, Sony to Acquire Culver Studios for Columbia, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 1991, at D1;
Sony Wants to Buy Orion Pictures, REUTERS, Feb. 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, ARCNWS File; Sony Finishes Columbia Buyout, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1989, at
P3; Sony Buys Guber-Peters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1989, at D3.
363. See, e.g., Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. Home Video, Inc., 825 F.2d 1559, 1563
(1 th Cir. 1987) (Sherman and Clayton Acts) (defining product market as all "passive
visual entertainment"); Satellite Television & Associated Resources, Inc. v. Continental
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at least as far back as 1975, the DOJ has argued that, in certain
circumstances, newspapers, television stations, and radio stations
are all competitors and, therefore, should be included in the same
product market.364  Also, in Satellite Television v. Continental
Cablevision of Va., Inc., 714 F.2d 351, 355 (4th Cir. 1983) (discussing competition
among all entertainment media), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984) (Sherman Act deci-
sion); New York Citizens Comm. on Cable TV v. Manhattan Cable TV, Inc., 651 F.
Supp. 802, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Sherman Act) (holding that plaintiffs definition of the
relevant product market as that for "pay cable television movie and non-sports entertain-
ment services" was specific and sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss); see also In
re Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Comm'n's Rules Relating
to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 50 F.C.C.2d
1046, 1057 (1975) (explaining the DOJ's position that the public principally relies on
newspapers and television stations for its news). But see United States v. Columbia
Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (Sherman and Clayton Acts)
(holding.that feature films exhibited on television do not compete with radio and movies
shown in motion picture theatres, Where the "consumers" involved in the case are televi-
sion stations).
One commentator, pointing to studies which demonstrate that transmission medium
influences consumer choice, has argued that a product market definition for video pro-
gramming should focus on the content of the program, as well as "on the media them-
selves." Boadwee, supra note 149, at 1211; see also id. at 1225 n.106; Note, Defining
the Relevant Product Market of the New Video Technologies, 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 75, 102 (1985) (arguing that video programming product markets should be defined
by program types). The significance of the effect that the transmission medium has,
however, may depend largely on program type. For example, one commentator points
to a study that shows that consumers consider media substitutable only for certain pro-
gram types: cinemas and broadcast television were considered substitutable for motion
pictures, but not for news. Boadwee, supra note 149, at 1225 n.106 (citations omitted).
Still, this study suggests that there is some substitutability between news on the radio and
through other media. Id. at 1213 n.15 (citations omitted).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in National Ass'n of Theatre
Owners v. FCC, also took note of various experts' product market definitions for video
programming: (1) "all entertainment available in a given area"; (2) "all television pro-
gramming available in the area"; (3) "all programs or performances of a given type, such
as motion pictures or sporting events, which could be seen in live performances and other
media"; (4) "subcategories within program types, such as films less than two years old
or athletic events featuring home town teams"; (5) "and unique individual programs."
420 F.2d 194, 204 (D.C. Cir, 1969) (citing In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Comm'n's
Rules and Regulations to Provide for Subscription Television Service, 15 F.C.C.2d 466,
474-78, 494-509 (1968)).
364. See In re Multiple Ownership, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1056 n. 11. According to the
DOJ, newspapers, television stations, and radio stations are all engaged in the same
business of attracting audiences and selling them to advertisers. Id. While the DOJ does
acknowledge that the three are not interchangeable for all advertisers, it asserts that the
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Cablevision,365 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "cine-
ma, broadcast television, video disks and cassettes, and other types
of leisure and entertainment-related businesses for customers who
live in single-family dwellings and apartment houses" were reason-
ably interchangeable and constituted a single product market. 6
6
Similarly, according to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Cable
Holdings of Georgia v. Home Video, Inc. ,367 consumers perceive
cable television, satellite television, video cassette recordings, and
free broadcast television to be reasonable substitutes.368
In Cable Holdings, the three corporate parties, Cable Holdings,
Home Video, and Wometco, were engaged in the cable television
three are far more alike than they are different. Id. Also, at least one commentator has
suggested that there is some substitutability between news on the radio and on other
media. Boadwee, supra note 149, at 1213 n.15 (citations omitted). In New York City,
for example, consumers may obtain local news, social calendars and sports information
from: (1) local newspapers, including the New York Post and New York Newsday; (2)
news radio stations, including WINS Radio, 1010 AM; and (3) New York 1, a 24 hour
all news cable channel that focuses on events within and concerning New York City.
365. 714 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984).
366. Id. at 355 (emphasis added). There has been considerable debate as to whether
"pay-TV" actually competes with, or merely supplements "free TV." See, e.g., National
Ass'n of Theatre Owners, 420 F.2d at 197 n.7 (discussing the pricing structure of the
television industry and competition between nationwide over-the-air subscription televi-
sion and broadcast television) (citing Subscription Television Service, 15 F.C.C.2d at
548); Boadwee, supra note 149, at 1225 n.109 (citations omitted). As noted in National
Association of Theatre Owners, "[t]he public's access to the broadcast media has never
been wholly free; at a minimum, it has been necessary to procure and maintain the neces-
sary apparatus for receiving broadcasts .... 420 F.2d at 206. Also, "free TV is not
really free. The advertising costs which support free TV are eventually passed on to the
public, and a profit is made by the licensee or others from the use of the public's chan-
nels." id. at 197 n.7 (quoting Subscription Television Service, 15 F.C.C.2d at 548).
Finally, advertiser-supported television is free "only in the sense that viewers cannot pay
directly for programs," because viewers still pay indirectly through higher prices on
advertised goods. Boadwee, supra note 149, at 1215 n.27 (citations omitted).
Nevertheless, some economists contend that free television is indeed "free" because,
"as more and more units of a particular commodity are sold, the purchase price goes
down and the advertising price goes down and the advertising costs are borne not by the
public, but by the results of mass production." National Ass'n of Theatre Owners, 420
F.2d at 197 n.7 (citations omitted).
367. 825 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 1987).
368. See id. at 1563 (affirming the district court's definition of the relevant product
market).
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business3 69 in Cobb County, Georgia.3 70  The antitrust allegations
in the suit arose out of an attempt by the plaintiff, Cable Holdings,
to expand its cable business into an area of the county known as
the "western territory. 37' In addition to a number of Sherman Act
accusations,372 the plaintiff charged that the merger between Home
Video and Wometco violated Section 7.373
Regarding the relevant market definition, the Cable Holdings
court held that all "passive visual entertainment" was reasonably
interchangeable by consumers and constituted a single product
market.374 In addition, the court found that the two merged compa-
nies did not control a significant portion of the relevant product
market and, consequently, no anticompetitive effects arose from the
merger.375 The Eleventh Circuit thus held that the district court had
properly dismissed Cable Holdings' Section 7 claim, on the
grounds that Cable Holdings had failed to prove that the merger
would monopolize a significant portion of the relevant product
market.3
76
Regarding the definition of the relevant geographic market in
an antitrust merger analysis of the television or radio industry,
some courts have examined the range of broadcasting signals,377
369. The cable television industry involves the distribution of over-the-air broadcast
signals, pay services (such as HBO, Cinemax, and Disney) and locally-originated televi-
sion through a network of cable. Id. at 1560. This cable network connects the "head
end" of the system (an antenna or earth station which receives signals communicated via
satellite) to a system of coaxial cable with further connection to each individual subscrib-
er. Id. The coaxial cable is generally strung along utility poles. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Cable Holdings accused Wometco and Home Video of taking various actions
to prevent it from competing for subscribers in the western territory, in violation of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 1561. Specifically, the allegedly anticompetitive actions included:
(1) instituting a sham lawsuit in state court for the purpose of deterring Cable Holdings'
expansion into the western territory; (2) opposing Cable Holdings' application for a
franchise in the western territory; (3) seeking a revocation of the plaintiff's franchise for
the western territory; and (4) erecting strand in the western territory, thus inhibiting Cable
Holdings from stringing its own strand. Id. Strand is defined as "wire hung on utility
poles that is used to support the coaxial cable which carries a cable television signal."
Id. at 1560.
373. Id. at 1561.
374. Id. at 1563 (affirming district court's definition of the relevant market).
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. See, e.g., Ralph C. Wilson Indus. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 598 F. Supp.
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while other courts have looked to different criteria,378 to determine
the area of effective competition. For example, in Ralph C. Wilson
v. American Broadcasting Companies,3 79 the court ruled that the
entire San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose Bay area constituted a com-
plete geographic market,8 where the plaintiff and defendants oper-
ated several television stations.381 In arriving at this decision, the
court weighed several factors, including: (1) that the Federal Com-
munications Commission ("FCC") regarded the area as one market;
(2) that the two recognized national ratings services, A.C. Nielson
Company and Arbitron Company, considered the region to be a
single market; (3) that there was a large overlap in the signal cov-
erage of both the plaintiff's and defendants' television signals; and
(4) that the plaintiff's and defendants' television stations shared a
substantial overlap of viewers.382
D. Inconsistencies Among Previous Media Antitrust Decisions
By placing the antitrust analyses of the newspaper, motion
picture, and television and radio industries side-by-side, a signifi-
694 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,185 (9th Cir. 1986) (antitrust
case); Satellite Television & Assoc. Resources v. Continental Cablevision, 714 F.2d 351
(4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984); Midwest Radio Co. v. Forum Publish-
ing Co., 942 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the geographic market for
mass media advertising was the Fargo, North Dakota-Moorhead, Minnesota metropolitan
area, where the parties were a local daily newspaper, a network-affiliated television
station, and FM and AM radio stations); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom
Entertainment Servs., 746 F. Supp. 320, 323-24, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that there
was a national geographic market, where the plaintiff was engaged in the national busi-
ness of licensing performing rights in the copyrighted musical compositions of its affiliat-
ed composers and publishers, and the defendant was a national cable television service
provider, which acquired, produced, and marketed various video programming, including
music performances).
378. See, e.g., Northeastern Educ. Television of Ohio, Inc. v. Educational Television
Assoc. of Metro. Cleveland, 758 F. Supp. 1568, 1579 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that the
relevant geographic market was "a 'world market' of available public television program-
ming," where the parties were public television stations and distributors of public televi-
sion programming).
379. 598 F. Supp. 694 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,185
(9th Cir. 1986) (antitrust case).
380. Id. at 703.
381. Id. at 698.
382. Id. at 703 (citations omitted).
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cant inconsistency arises: courts approach the product market defi-
nition differently across media industry sub-categories. As ex-
plained above, a court must focus on the reasonable
interchangeability of a product with its substitutes in constructing
the outer boundaries of a product market definition. 3  Where con-
sumers perceive products as interchangeable, those products should
be included in the same product market.3 4
Regarding the media industry, courts are gradually adopting two
approaches for recognizing competition among differing media
products: a compartmentalized approach and a broad-market ap-
proach. Under the compartmentalized approach, courts find con-
sumers' perception of media product substitutability as limited.385
By finding that a particular media product has few substitutes,
these courts contract the outer boundaries of the product market,
resulting in a particularly narrow relevant market definition.386 One
sub-category of the media industry for which courts have adopted
this compartmentalized approach is the newspaper industry-as
explained above, newspaper antitrust decisions rarely recognize
competition among newspapers, radio, and television in consumer
news and information markets. 387
In contrast to the compartmentalized approach, the broad-mar-
ket approach expands the outer boundaries of the product market
definition to include media product competition across industry
sub-categories. For example, in motion picture antitrust decisions,
courts have gradually been accepting the notion that competition
exists among first-run films, sub-run films, and video
383. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text (discussing the law of product
substitutability).
384. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing the law of product
substitutability and interchangeability).
385. See, e.g., discussion supra part II.A (discussing the antitrust analysis of the
newspaper industry).
386. See supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text (discussing the Times Mirror
court's decision to exclude radio and television from the product market definition).
387. See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text (explaining that courts generally
do not include other forms of media in the relevant product market definition for the
newspaper antitrust analysis).
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aftermarkets.8 s Similarly, in television antitrust decisions, courts
have also held that cable television, satellite television, video cas-
sette recordings, and broadcast television-dubbed collectively as
"passive visual entertainment" 389
-- do, in some circumstances, com-
pete for viewers. 39
This section does not advocate either compartmentalized or
broad-market analyses for media antitrust decisions. Moreover, this
section does not argue that certain courts erroneously followed one
approach over the other, given the relevant economic and business
facts at the time each individual case was decided. Nonetheless,
it is important to note that the evolution of a compartmentalized
versus broad-market approach distinction has lead to an inconsis-
tent recognition of competition in the media industry.
III. RISING COMPETITION AND CONSOLIDATION REQUIRES COURTS
TO ADOPT A NEW ANTITRUST MODEL FOR MULTIMEDIA
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
A. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 is a New Stimulus for
Multimedia Competition and Consolidation
As discussed above in Part I, the development of video
aftermarkets, computerized information services, and other tech-
nology has dramatically transformed competition within the media
industry.391 Also contributing to the rise of media competition and
consolidation, however, is the Telecommunications Act of 1996392
(the "Telecom Act" or the "Act"). 393 The Telecom Act amends the
388. See supra notes 324-25 and accompanying text (discussing competition among
motion picture exhibitors and other forms of media).
389. Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. Home Video, Inc., 825 F.2d 1559, 1563 (11th
Cir. 1987).
390. See supra note 374 and accompanying text (explaining that all passive visual
entertainment compete).
391. See supra notes 309, 345, 359 (discussing the development of video
aftermarkets); supra note 260 (discussing computerized information services).
392. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (to
be codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
393. President Clinton signed the Telecom Act into law on February 8, 1996. See
Amy Boardman, Law Firms at the Ready; A Hot Practice Area Just Got Hotter, LEGAL
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Communications Act of 1934 39 and deregulates much of the tele-
communications and media industries.39 5 By eliminating regulatory
barriers that block competition among local phone companies, long-
distance carriers, and cable television companies,396 the Telecom
Act is intended to provide for fair competition between local and
long-distance telephone companies 39 and to promote the continued
TIMES, Feb. 12, 1996, at 1. The Telecom Act substantially deregulates the communica-
tions industry and will allow for new competition for local phone service, as well as the
introduction of new technology. See Susan Farmer, Telecom Bill Prompts Competition,
COLUMBIAN, Feb. 21, 1996, at D5. According to Senator Ernest F. Hollings (D-SC),
ranking minority member of the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, the
legislation will promote competition by unleashing the ingenuity of the telecommunica-
tions industry. President Signs Measure to Reform Telecom Sector, ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA), Feb. 15, 1996, at 187.
394. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1994)).
395. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference to the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996 [hereinafter "Statement Accompanying the Telecom Act"] (stating
that the Telecom Act is designed to provide deregulatory national policy framework for
telecommunications and information technologies and services); Boardman, supra note
393, at 1 ("the telecommunications act is the biggest rewrite of the communications code
in 60 years"); Dominic Bencivenga, Communications Law; For Lawyers, Future Holds
Regulation, Litigation, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1996, at 5 ("The federal Telecommunications
Acts of 1996 is expected to revolutionize the telecommunications industry .... "); id.
(reporting that the Telecom Act "represents the most sweeping reform of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 to date"); see also infra notes 399-413 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing some of the deregulation that would follow from the Telecom Act).
396. See Kirk Victor, Media Monsters, NAT. J., Mar. 2, 1996, at 480 (stating that the
new Telecom Act "will promote head-to-head competition between the local telephone,
long-distance and cable television industries"); Sallie Hofmeister & Leslie Helm, U.S.
West to Buy Cable Firm for $10.8 Billion; Mergers: Continental Deal is First Major
Consolidation of Phone Carrier, Cable Operator, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1996, at Al
(maintaining that the Telecom Act "opens the cable and the long-distance telephone and
local telephone businesses to fierce new competition"); Bencivenga, supra note 395, at
5 (stating that the Telecom Act allows local telephone companies to provide long-distance
service and long-distance companies to provide local service, and permits telephone/cable
cross ownership, giving cable companies the opportunity to provide telephone services
and telephone companies to deliver video programming).
397. Statement Accompanying Telecom Act, supra note 395; see Deal Struck on
Telecom Act, Clearing Way for Final Passage, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA),
at A-245 (Dec. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Deal Struck on Telecom Act] (citing Vice President
Al Gore); Cable TV, Telephone Reform Stalls; House GOP Seeks More Deregulation of
Media Companies, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 22, 1995, at C1 [hereinafter Cable TV, Tele-
phone Reform] (citing Vice President Al Gore); Chris Woodyard, Telecommunications Bill
Offers Sweeping Overhaul, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 21, 1995, at Al (citing Vice President
1996]
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development of interactive media.398
Regarding television, the Telecom Act repeals or modifies
many television ownership limitations.399 First, the Act eliminates
cable cross-ownership restrictions, 400 thereby permitting a single
person or entity to own or control both a network of broadcast
television stations and a cable television system. 401 Second, the Act
increases the percent of national viewers that television stations can
reach from the former limit of 25 percent to 35 percent.4" 2 Third,
it eliminates FCC restrictions on the number of television stations
that a person or entity "may directly or indirectly own, operate, or
control, or have a cognizable interest in, nationwide.'' 3  Fourth,
the Act directs the FCC to reevaluate its multiple ownership rules,
which restrict ownership of more than one television station in a
local market.4°4 Fifth, the Act orders the FCC to exempt the top 50
markets from its "One-to-a-Market" rule,405 which bans cross-own-
ership of radio and television stations in the same market.4°6 Final-
Al Gore).
398. Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat. at 141 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§
230(a)(5), 230(b)(1)) (finding that "increasingly Americans are relying on interactive
media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services[,]" and
that "[iut is the policy of the United States ... to promote the continued development of
... interactive media").
399. See generally id. 110 Stat. at 112-14 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 202).
400. See generally 47 C.F.R. 76.501 (1995).
401. Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat. at 114 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §
202(0(1)).
402. Id., 110 Stat. at 113 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1)(B)).
403. Id., 110 Stat. at 113 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1)(A)).
404. Id., 110 Stat. at 113 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 202(c)(2)). Specifically, the
Act directs the FCC to conduct a rulemaking proceeding to determine whether the Com-
mission should retain, modify or eliminate the multiple ownership rules. Id. Nonetheless,
"['it is the intention of [the managers on the part of the Houses and the Senate at the
conference on the disagreeing vetoes of the two House (the "conferees")] that, if the
[FCC] revises the multiple ownership rules, it shall permit VHF-VHF combinations only
in compelling circumstances." Statement Accompanying Telecom Act, supra note 395,
§ 202.
405. See Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat. at 113 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §
202(d)).
406. Statement Accompanying Telecom Act, supra note 395, § 202. According to
Roy Stewart, Chief of the FCC Mass Media Bureau, the Bureau will soon be considering
a ban on newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership. "Don't Stumble Around"; FCC's Stewart
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ly, the Act directs the FCC to revise its rules concerning "dual
networks," 407 thus permitting a television station, either broadcast
or cable, to affiliate with a person or entity that maintains two or
more networks, unless such dual or multiple networks are com-
posed of: (1) two or more of the four existing networks (ABC,
CBS, NBC, and FOX) or, (2) any of the four existing networks and
one of the two emerging networks (WBTN and UPN). 4 8
Concerning radio ownership, the Telecom Act eliminates all
FCC provisions limiting the number of AM or FM broadcast sta-
tions that one entity may own or control nationally.4° In addition,
one entity may now own up to five stations or 50 percent of all
stations, whichever is less, in small markets with 0-14 stations.4 0
In markets with 15-29 stations, one company may own six sta-
tions;411 in markets of 30-44 stations, one company may own seven
stations; 412 and in markets with more than 45 stations, one company
Sets'Out Priorities for Mass Media Bureau, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Mar. 5, 1996, at
3.
407. Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat. at 113 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §
202(e)).
408. Statement Accompanying the Telecom Act, supra note 395, § 202 ("The confer-
ees do not intend these limitations to apply if such networks are not operated simulta-
neously, or if there is no substantial overlap in the territory served by the group of sta-
tions comprising each such networks.") The Telecom Act does not, however, prohibit a
merger between the two emerging networks: WBTN and UPN. Jay L. Birnbaum, Part-
ner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Address at the Fordham Finance, Securities
and Tax Law Forum Inaugural Symposium (Mar. 12, 1996).
409. Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat. at 113 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §
202(a)). Prior to passage of the new Telecom Act, one company could only own 20 AM
and 20 FM radio stations nationally. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(1)(i) (1995).
410. Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat. at 113 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §
202(b)(1)(D)). Prior to the Telecom Act, in markets with 14 or fewer commercial radio
stations, "[one] party [could] own up to 3 commercial radio stations, no more than 2 of
which [were] in the same service (AM or FM), provided that the owned stations, if other
than a single AM and FM station combination, represent[ed] less than 50 percent of the
stations in the market." 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a)(1)(i).
411. Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat. at 113 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §
202(b)(1)(C)). Prior to the new Telecom Act, "[iun radio markets with 15 or more com-
mercial radio stations, a party [could] own up to two AM and two FM commercial sta-
tions, provided, however, that evidence that grant of any application [would have] re-
sult[ed] in a combined audience share exceeding 25 percent [would have been] considered
prima facie inconsistent with the public interest." 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a)(1)(ii).
412. Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat. at 113 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §
202(b)(1)(B)).
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may own eight stations.413
According to many commentators, the new Telecom Act paves
the way for "wave after wave" 414 of multimedia t mergers and
acquisitions.416 Once firms can own more stations, cable television
and entertainment companies will probably see even more consoli-
dation within their respective industries.417 In addition, where Con-
gress permits cable television and local and long-distance telephone
companies to compete directly,1 8 mergers and alliances between
telecommunications and cable enterprises will likely follow.
4 19
413. id., 110 Stat. at 113 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 202(b)(1)(A)).
414. Analyst Predicts "Wave After Wave" of Telecom Mergers (CNN television
broadcast, Feb. 28, 1996) [hereinafter "CNN Broadcast"].
415. "Multimedia" is defined as "Telephones + Wireless + Cable." Mark Landler,
U.S. West's Continental Ambitions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1996, at Dl.
416. Id.; Telcos in Merger Craze, TELECOMMUNICATIONS ALERT, Feb. 29, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File (reporting that about one-third of
telecom companies interviewed are more likely to pursue mergers and acquisitions in
1996 than in 1995); Diane Mermigas, Telecom Act Opens Floodgates on TV Station Sales,
Mergers, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Feb. 26, 1996, at 32 ("TV station sales and mergers will
soon mirror the flood of radio deals spurred by the passage of the new telecommunica-
tions law .. "); Leibowitz, supra, note 232, at 5. Mergers and acquisitions in the media
industry are expected to follow from the lessening of ownership restrictions, such as those
discussed above for the television and radio industries. See Mermigas, supra, at 32.
While the Telecom Act certainly provides incentives for media mergers and acquisitions,
it explicitly states that it does not "modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any
of the antitrust laws." Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat. at 131 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 401(b)).
417. See Gene Marcial, It's Radio Days in the Buyout Game, BUS. WK., Mar. 4,
1996, at 94 (stating that Wall Street expects a "rash of mergers and acquisitions" in the
radio industry as a result of the Telecom Act); Kevin McKenzie, Owner of WMC Stations
Ponders Options, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Jan. 16, 1996, at B5 (discussing a particular
corporate owner of television and radio stations in the Memphis area that now considers
a sale of its company more likely, as a result of the anticipated lessening of media owner-
ship regulation).
418. Statement Accompanying Telecom Act, supra note 395.
419. See Woodyard, supra note 397, at Al (stating that mergers and alliances of
telecommunications companies are sure to follow passage of the Telecom Act); Cable TV,
Telephone Reform, supra note 397, at Cl. For example, a mere 19 days after President
Clinton signed the Telecom Act into law, U.S. West, which provides local phone service
in 14 Western states, announced a $10.8 billion merger with Continental Cablevision, the
nation's third-largest cable-TV operator. See Catherine Artst & Peter Burrows, U.S.
West's Gauntlet Won't Just Lie There, BUS. WK., Mar. 11, 1996, at 32. Prior to the
Telecom Act, Congress prohibited telephone companies from providing cable services in
their service areas. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1994) (formerly called the 1984 Cable Act).
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Finally, the Telecom Act provides multimedia companies with
the opportunity to offer consumers a bundle of communications
services, including local and long-distance telephone services, wire-
less communication, and cable television.420 Ultimately, then, the
Telecom Act is likely to result in an evolutionary blurring of the
line between telecommunications and entertainment,421 producing
major multimedia conglomerates, 422 and rendering traditional no-
Originally, such bans on cross-ownership were developed to protect the cable industry
from the once dominant telephone companies. See Application of Tel. Cos. for § 214
Certifications for Channel Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Televi-
sion Sys., 21 F.C.C.2d 307, 323-26 (1970), modified, 22 F.C.C.2d 746 (1970), aff'd sub
nom. General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971). In 1992, however,
the FCC recommended that Congress lift such cross-ownership restrictions, given how
well-established the cable industry had become. In re Telephone Co.-Cable Television
Cross-Ownership Rules, Second Report and Order, Recommendation to Congress, and
Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 5781, 5847-51 (1992).
420. See generally Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat. at 121-27 (to be codified at
47 U.S.C. § 302) (authorizing cable and television cross-ownership); Arnst & Burrows,
supra note 419, at 32; Daniel Bergstein, Mega-Mergers on Information Superhighway,
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 11, 1995, at 7. Studies have indicated that a market for convergent cable
and telephone products exist. Id. One study in particular found that 66 percent of homes
favor some bundling of basic cable and telephony. Id. According to Ivan Seidenberg,
CEO of Nynex, however, customers do not want one-stop shopping. See Andrew Kupfer,
An Exciting Story About Nynex-Really, FORTUNE, Mar. 18, 1996, at 54 ("Nobody wants
to be owned by a single provider. Anybody who believes he can win all of a customer's
business has got to be crazy.").
421. See Arnst & Burrows, supra note 419, at 32 (describing "the converging world
of telecom and video"). According to one commentator:
[A] slew of [communications industry] mega-mergers and alliances have result-
ed in a convergence of discrete elements of the industry which traditionally
were separated. It seems as if, on any given day, telephone companies become
cable operators, cable companies become telephone companies, both enterprises
forge ahead into personal communications services (PCS), and even movie
studios get in on the act by becoming broadcast conglomerates.
Bergstein, supra note 420, at 7; see also id. ("The recent flurry of mega-media transac-
tions has made one thing clear: Convergence will continue.").
422. According to one commentator, the U.S. media industry is starting to resemble
the Japanese keiretsu system, in which a chain of companies, such as a bank, a manufac-
turer, and a parts supplier, work together and own shares of one another's stock. Farhi,
supra note 26, at HI. In fact, there are already several examples of enormous joint
ventures, cross alliances, and partial share holdings among the media giants: N lynex
Corp., a regional phone company, owns a $1 billion share of Viacom, the parent of MTV;
U.S. West, another regional Bell company, has a $2.5 billion position in Time Warner;
MCI Communications Corp. has invested $2 billion in Tele-Communications Inc. ("TCI"),
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tions of "telephone companies," "cable companies" and "movie
companies" obsolete.423
B. A New Antitrust Model is Needed for Multimedia Mergers
and Acquisitions Because Current Standards Fail to Address
the Media Industry's Changing Competitive Landscape
Competition in the media industry has undergone dramatic and
far-reaching change since decisions such as Paramount Pictures
and Times Mirror were handed down in 1948 and 1967, respective-
ly.424 Specifically, the rise of technology and the corresponding
changes in legislation that has followed has created competition
where, in fact, competition never previously existed.425 Further-
more, past media antitrust decisions are inconsistent across industry
sub-categories, and are inadequate for analyzing multimedia merg-
426ers and acquisitions.
With so much new technology and legislation stimulating the
simultaneous rising forces of media competition and consolidation,
applying existing antitrust law to the multimedia industry moves
beyond the realm of "exceptionally difficult ' '427 to the level of near-
ly impossible. Therefore, as explained in the following three sub-
sections, the evolving competitive landscape of the media industry
requires a new model for the multimedia antitrust analysis.
1. The Rise of Technology Has Spurred Changes in Media
Product Substitutability
From the demand side, consumers increasingly are viewing
formerly discrete channels of media as interchangeable or substitut-
and two other cable giants in a wireless phone venture. id.
423. Bergstein, supra note 420, at 7.
424. See supra notes 351-62 and accompanying text (discussing Paramount Pic-
tures); supra notes 269-306 and accompanying text (discussing Times Mirror).
425. See discussion infra part III.B. 1 (discussing technology's effect on competition
in the media industry); discussion infra part IlI.B.2 (discussing the Telecom Act's effect
on competition in the media industry).
426. See discussion infra part III.B.3 (explaining that media antitrust decisions are
inconsistent across industry sub-categories).
427. National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970) (discussing the difficulty of applying antitrust law to
the entertainment industry).
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able products.428 For example, as noted by courts in such decisions
as Syufy, Loew's Inc., and United States v. Tracinda Investment
Corporation,429 the advent of vast and rapid technological changes
in the motion picture industry has resulted in substantial ancillary
markets for movies.43° Consequently, consumers today can respond
to a price increase by a first-run movie exhibitor by choosing, in-
stead, to watch a movie on broadcast, cable, or pay-per-view televi-
sion, or by renting a film on videocassette.43'
As this example demonstrates, recent technological innovation
has lead to a rise in media product substitutability. Nonetheless,
courts fail to consistently recognize that competition exists among
different media exhibiting similar content.432 Therefore, a new
antitrust model is needed for the media industry that reflects tech-
nological innovation, and the corresponding change in market reali-
ties.
2. Legislative Changes Have Altered the Manner in which
Media Companies Compete
Just as competition in the media industry has evolved from the
demand side, it has also shifted from the supply side.433 As ex-
428. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (explaining that product substi-
tutability must be considered from the demand side of a market).
429. 477 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
430. See supra notes 313-42 and accompanying text (discussing Syufy); supra notes
345, 353-61 and accompanying text (discussing Loew's Inc.); supra notes 307, 346 (dis-
cussing Tracinda).
431. See supra notes 331-32 and accompanying text (explaining that consumers may
respond to a price increase in first-run films, by renting a video cassette or watching one
on cable television).
432. See discussion infra part III.B.3 (explaining that media antitrust decisions are
inconsistent industry sub-categories). In a hypothetical newspaper antitrust case in New
York City, for example, a court would likely refuse to include such newspapers as the
New York Times, the New York Daily News, and the New York Post in the same "news
and information" product market as New York 1-a twenty-four hour news cable televi-
sion station that reports events affecting and occurring in the city. This is because news-
paper antitrust decisions generally do not include radio and television news broadcasting
as substitutes for newspapers, even though the rise of technology has created competition
among these media. See infra notes 265-66 and accompanying text (explaining that
courts generally do not include other forms of media in the relevant product market
definition for the newspaper antitrust analysis).
433. See supra notes 148-66 and accompanying text (explaining that the antitrust
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plained above, the recent Telecom Act has opened up new competi-
tion within the media industry.434 For example, media companies
today can sell consumers a package of diverse products that those
companies formerly were prohibited from offering.435 Also, under
the Act, certain multimedia companies are permitted not only to
compete directly, but also to merge with and acquire each other.436
Finally, with the restrictions on television and radio station
ownership significantly lessened,437 media companies are encour-
aged to consolidate438 in order to achieve higher market shares and
economies of scale. 439 Consequently, the antitrust analysis of mul-
timedia mergers and acquisitions must adequately consider recent
changes in competition from the supply side of the industry.
3. Past Media Decisions Are Inconsistent Across Media
Sub-Categories
Finally, courts need a new model for the antitrust analysis' of
multimedia mergers and acquisitions because past decisions are
inconsistent across media sub-categories. As explained above in
Part II.D, courts deciding media antitrust cases in the past have
alternated between a compartmentalized and broad-market approach
for determining media product substitutability. For example, news-
paper antitrust decisions rarely recognize competition among news-
papers, radio, and television in consumer news and information
markets.440
analysis must consider competition from the supply side of a market).
434. See discussion supra part III.A (discussing the Telecom Act).
435. See supra note 420 and accompanying text (explaining that the Telecom Act
permits media companies to offer consumers packages of services). As explained below
in part III.C.1, courts should apply the "cluster market" doctrine in this situation.
436. See supra notes 414-19 and accompanying text (explaining that the Telecom
Act creates direct competition among multimedia companies, and paves the way for a
wave of multimedia consolidation).
437. See supra notes 399-413 and accompanying text (discussing the lessening of
restrictions on television and radio station ownership).
438. See supra note 417 and accompanying text (explaining that mergers and acquisi-
tions of television and radio stations are likely to result from the Telecom Act).
439. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text (explaining economies of scale).
440. See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text (explaining that courts generally
do not include other forms of media in the relevant product market definition for the
newspaper antitrust analysis).
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In contrast, motion picture antitrust decisions have gradually
started accepting the argument that competition exists among first-
run films, sub-run films, video aftermarkets, and cable television.441
Similarly, television antitrust decisions have also held that cable
television, satellite television, video cassette recordings, and free
broadcast television--dubbed collectively "passive visual entertain-
ment"4 2---do, in some circumstances, compete for viewers." 3
The approaches taken in newspaper, motion picture, and televi-
sion decisions may have reflected market realities at one time.
Nonetheless, these "older media" decisions cannot guide future
courts because the past decisions recognize competition on an in-
consistent basis. Where companies are suddenly permitted to own
amalgamations of publishing, television, radio, motion picture, and
computerized interactive media concerns,'" courts must adopt a
new antitrust model that consistently recognizes competition across
media sub-categories.
C. Developing an Antitrust Model for Multimedia Mergers and
Acquisitions That Recognizes Competition Where
Competition Exists
As explained above in Part II1.B, current antitrust standards
cannot guide future courts in analyzing multimedia consolidations,
where those standards do not reflect changing market realities and
competition accurately. What is needed, therefore, is a new anti-
trust model for multimedia mergers and acquisitions that, in the
words of Chief Justice Warren in Brown Shoe, "recognize[s] com-
petition where, in fact, competition exists.'445 What follows is a
framework for analysis for: (1) defining the relevant market for
multimedia; (2) estimating the merging firms' strength in the rele-
441. See supra notes 324-25 and accompanying text (discussing competition among
motion picture exhibitors and other forms of media).
442. Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. Home Video, Inc., 825 F.2d 1559, 1563 (lth
Cir. 1987).
443. See supra note 374 and accompanying text (explaining that all passive visual
entertainment compete).
444. See supra notes 414-19 and accompanying text (explaining that the Telecom
Act permits new consolidations of multimedia companies).
445. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 326.
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vant market, and (3) examining industry- and transaction-specific
factors.46
1. Defining the Relevant Market for Multimedia
As discussed above,447 defining a relevant market is a two-part
process: drawing the line of commerce, or product market, and
delineating the effective area of competition, or geographic mar-
ket." 8 In determining the relevant product market for the media
industry, various courts and agencies have diverged significantly in
the past.449 For example, in some newspaper antitrust cases, courts
have defined the product market as microscopically as "daily local
newspapers. 45 °  Considering, however, that consumers in some
geographic markets today can obtain local news, social calendars,
and sports information from many other sources,451 this definition
is overly narrow. On the other hand, an "all-inclusive" definition,
similar to one purported by the FCC452-grouping all information
and entertainment media into a single market-provides an equally
unsatisfactory result, given the diversity of media channels that has
446. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (describing the three-step process
for antitrust merger analysis).
447. See discussion supra part I.C.1.
448. See supra notes 139-74 and accompanying text (discussing the law of relevant
markets).
449. Compare supra notes 266, 283-93 (describing product markets for newspapers)
and supra notes 322-33 (describing product markets for motion picture exhibition) with
supra notes 363-69, 374 (describing product markets for television and radio industries).
450. See, e.g., Community Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146, 1155
(W.D. Ark. 1995); United States v. Times Mirror Co., 274 F. Supp. 606, 614 (C.D. Cal.
1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 712 (1968); see also supra notes 283-93 (describing one particular
product market as "daily local newspapers").
451. See supra note 364 (suggesting some substitutability between local news in
newspapers and on the radio and television).
452. The FCC purported that all media are perfect substitutes in the context of
communications regulation. See, e.g., in re Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and
73.636 of the Comm'n's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Televi-
sion Broadcast Stations, 95 F.C.C.2d 360, 387-89 & n.101 (1983) (Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking); In re Amendment of Section 73.3555, [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, and
73.636] of the Comm'n's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Televi-
sion Broadcast Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, 25-26, 54 (1984) (Report and Order); see also
Boadwee, supra note 149, at 1211 n.3 (discussing the FCC's definition); supra note 262
(explaining that the FCC has suggested that consumers regard all media as reasonable
substitutes).
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resulted from the rapid advances in cable, telecommunications, and
information delivery technologies in recent years.453
An appropriate product market definition for multimedia, then,
can only follow from focusing on the special characteristics of the
industry.454 First, courts and enforcement agencies should recog-
nize that consumers' perception of media interchangeability varies,
depending on the content of that media.4" Second, consumers'
propensity to substitute media is also a function of "communication
medium.' 456  Third, the content on some forms of media is more
heavily regulated than on others, thereby limiting competition
among some media.4 57 Finally, multimedia firms can now provide
"one-stop shopping" benefits to consumers, as a result of the re-
cently passed Telecom Act.458 Viewed individually or together,
such characteristics significantly affect the mode of competition in
the marketplace and, in turn, must be factored into the product
453. See supra notes 266, 345, 359 (discussing the development of video
aftermarkets); supra notes 391-423 and accompanying text (discussing the effect that the
Telecom Act will. have on competition in the telecommunications and cable industries);
supra note 260 (discussing recent advances in computerized information services and real-
time document sharing).
454. See supra notes 132-35 (explaining that antitrust merger law must reflect eco-
nomic and market realities).
455. See supra note 325 (explaining that consumers generally consider similar "pro-
gram types" as reasonable substitutes).
456. This Note defines "communication medium" as the medium on which a content
genre is communicated. Cf. supra note 363 (discussing substitutability of video program-
ming, based on transmission medium).
457. For example, broadcast media is more highly regulated for indecent content than
print media or cable television. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 484 U.S. 726, 748 (1978)
("[O]f all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that [receives] the most limited First
Amendment protection."); id. at 739 ("[Tjhe government's interest in the well-being of
its youth justifies special treatment of indecent broadcasting."); id. at 741-42 n.17 (ex-
plaining that governmental interference of obscene and indecent print publications is more
strictly scrutinized than governmental interference of obscene and indecent broadcasts);
Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420 (11th Cir. 1985) (explaining that cable television is
subject to less government interference than broadcast television).
Regarding ownership rules, however, the media industry recently became much less
regulated as a result of the passing of the Telecom Act. See discussion supra part III.A.
458. See supra note 420 and accompanying text (explaining that the Telecom Act
presents cable and telecommunications companies with the opportunity to offer bundled
services).
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market definition.459
Taking the special characteristics and market realities of the
multimedia industry into account, a product market definition for
multimedia merger analysis must include a definition of a product
market that recognizes competition where, in fact, competition
exists."0 Such a definition must focus on the medium's content,
as well as the manner in which it is communicated."' What fol-
lows is a three-step process for delineating a product market for the
multimedia industry: (1) create "content genres"; 462 (2) exclude
nonsubstitutable media; and (3) incorporate "cluster markets. 463
In the first step of the process, a court or enforcement agency
should group similar content genres into individual markets.4M4 By
limiting the outer boundaries of each product market to media that
communicates the same content genre, this first step minimizes the
danger that the amount of competition will be overstated. More-
over, creating content genres recognizes that different media do
compete, but only to the extent that they communicate similar mes-
sages. 465
After basing the initial product market definition on the applica-
ble content genre, the next step is to evaluate the special character-
459. See supra notes 132-35 (explaining that antitrust merger law must reflect eco-
nomic and market realities).
460. See supra note 144 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Brown Shoe).
461. See supra note 363 (explaining that transmission medium influences substitut-
ability); supra note 432 (explaining that communication medium influences substitutabili-
ty).
462. This Note defines "content genre" as "a group of texts set apart by similarities
in format, length, or content, such that viewers consider them reasonably substitutable."
Cf. supra note 325 (defining program types, which are analogous to content genres for
video programming). Examples of content genres include "motion pictures," "news," or
"variety shows."
463. See supra notes 151-56 (describing cluster markets).
464. For example, a "movies genre" would tentatively constitute a single product
market, because films are displayed on broadcast television, cable television, various pay
television services, videocassettes, and movie theaters.
465. See supra note 363 (explaining that program type influences substitutability);
supra notes 307-12, 321-33 and accompanying text (explaining that movies exhibited on
different media compete); supra note 364 (explaining that news appearing on radio and
other media compete). But see supra notes 266-93 (explaining that courts are hesitant to
recognize competition between newspapers and electronic media).
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istics of the communication medium.466 As it appears on a particu-
lar medium, a content genre may not be substitutable with the same
content genre appearing on another medium. 467  This may result
from the existence of: (1) technical or regulatory restrictions; 468 (2)
diehard consumers; 469 (3) temporal price discrimination;470 or, (4)
bundling.47 Media with such characteristics should, therefore, be
placed in their own markets, in order to avoid overinclusive market
definitions. For example, a preliminary "sports genre" may include
sporting events on television and radio, and in live arenas, newspa-
per stories, and movie theaters. Nonetheless, because the last two
media are not physically capable of broadcasting real-time images
or sound, they are limited substitutes of the first three. Thus, in
order to accurately "recognize competition where, in fact, competi-
466. See supra note 363 (explaining that transmission medium influences consumer
choice); supra note 458 (explaining that communication medium influences substitutabili-
ty).
467. See supra note 363 (explaining that transmission medium influences consumer
choice); supra note 458 (explaining that communication medium influences substitutabili-
ty).
468. An example of a technical restraint is newspapers' inability to report live news.
Similarly, an example of a regulatory restraint is broadcast television's inability to exhibit
sexually explicit programs. Cf. supra notes 350-62 and accompanying text (explaining
that judicial oversight restraints prevented vertical integration in the motion picture indus-
try between the 1950s and the 1980s); Syufy, 903 F.2d at 673 ("It is well known that
some of the most insurmountable barriers in the great race of competition are the result
of government regulation.").
469. See supra notes 157-66 and accompanying text (discussing price discrimination
and the effect on diehard consumers). Diehards are especially visible in the "live sports
broadcasting genre." See supra note 164.
470. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (defining temporal price discrimina-
tion). Similar to motion pictures in the 1930s and 1940s, movies today are subject to
temporal price discrimination because of aftermarkets: a first-run film may start in a
movie theater, move to a sub-run theater, show up on videocassettes, appear on pay-per-
view television, get to cable-television, and then, finally, reach broadcast television. See
supra notes 324-25 (explaining ancillary markets for motion pictures). Over time, the
price for viewing the film decreases, thus capturing more consumer surplus.
471. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (explaining bundling). Bundling is
especially popular in the cable-television business. In purchasing "basic cable service,"
cable television consumers usually purchase a standard package of channels. Examples
of the standard channels include MTV-a channel that exhibits primarily music videos
and other music-oriented programming-and CNN Headline News-a twenty-four hour
news service.
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tion exists,' '472 the preliminary sports genre line of commerce
should be divided into two submarkets: live sports exhibition and
"anecdotal" sports reporting.473
The final step of the product market definition is to incorporate
"cluster markets" and other supplier conduct into the analysis.474
Under the cluster market rationale, products that consumers tend to
purchase concurrently- from a single producer should be grouped
together, even if the products do not typically compete.475 Conse-
quently, the product market definition would be broadened to in-
clude such clustered goods.476 For example, because cable and
472. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 326.
473. Under the model that this Note proposes, some media may communicate more
than one content genre. For example, pay-per-view television and HBO-a cable televi-
sion station-both exhibit movies and live sporting events. Consequently, programming
on either medium could fall into either the "movies genre" or the "sports genre." In cases
such as this, each medium's market share for a particular content genre must be calculated
individually. While an example is helpful to illustrate this proposition, it does, unfortu-
nately, require drawing upon yet-to-be-discussed mechanics of the model.
With that caveat in mind, assume that a court is determining market concentration
of the "live sports broadcasting genre," based on total revenues. See infra note 492 and
accompanying text (explaining that market shares can be based on any number of crite-
ria). Assume further that only broadcasters in the relevant geographic market are HBO
and pay-per-view television.
To calculate HBO's market share, the court would include total revenues from all
HBO programming (including revenues from movies). This is because under the third
step for defining the product market-incorporating "bundling" and/or "cluster mar-
kets"-the court would recognize that HBO bundles its sports and movies programming.
See infra notes 474-80 and accompanying text (explaining that "cluster markets" must be
included in the multimedia product market definition). That is, cable subscribers' only
options are to purchase all or none of HBO's programming; they cannot buy individual
movies or sporting events from the channel. Consequently, movies exhibited on HBO
should be included in the same relevant market as sports exhibited on HBO, even though
those content genres are not typically interchangeable. See supra notes 464-65 and
accompanying text (explaining that consumers' perception of media substitutability varies,
depending on content).
In contrast, to calculate pay-per-view television's market share, the court would
include only those revenues derived from sporting events. This is because viewers of
pay-per-view television can purchase individual programs.
474. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text (explaining cluster markets).
"Other" supplier conduct would include price discrimination and bundling. See supra
notes 157-66 (discussing price discrimination and bundling).
475. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text (explaining cluster markets).
476. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text (explaining cluster markets).
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satellite television offers "one-stop shopping,"477 but broadcast
television does not, programs of all types exhibited on cable and
satellite television should be combined into a single cluster mar-
ket.478 Similarly, with the passage of the Telecom Act, cable and
telephone companies are permitted to offer packages of services,
including local and long-distance telephone services, wireless com-
munications, and cable television.479 As was the case with com-
mercial banking services in Philadelphia National Bank, such
goods and services should be included in the same relevant market,
even where those products do not typically compete.48 °
477. See supra note 152 (explaining "one-stop shopping"). Cable television distribu-
tors usually offer consumers a variety of channels, such as ESPN (sports genre) and HBO
(primarily movies genre), thatotherwise might not be substitutes for each other. Because
viewers generally purchase all channels from a single cable television distributor, antitrust
law requires that all channels that such distributors offer be included in a single product
market. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text (explaining that antitrust law
groups products which are bought or sold concurrently into a single product market).
478. See supra note 152 (explaining that cable and satellite television are subject to
the "one-stop shopping" rationale).
479. See generally Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat. at 121-27 (to be codified at
47 U.S.C. § 302); see supra note 405 (describing telecom and cable companies' abilities
to provide packages of services).
480. See id. at 355, 359-61; see supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text (explain-
ing that those products that do not typically compete, but are usually sold together, should
be included in the same product market).
With the above explanation of "content genres" in mind, it is prudent to note that
some commentators may find this notion to be controversial. See Letter from Robert D.
Joffe, Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, to Peter Nesvold (Apr. 28, 1996) [hereinafter
"Joffe Letter"] (on file with author) (explaining some of the arguments that commentators
might make in response to the model that this Note suggests). These commentators may
argue, for example, that the suggestion of a "movies genre" begs the question about types
of movies. See id. Hypothetically, one could continue to narrow the movies genre into
markets for children's movies, action movies, comedies, etc. See id. Therefore, these
commentators may conclude that the narrowing down process should not be begun at all,
leaving the market very broadly defined. See id.
Admittedly, a movies genre could theoretically continue to be narrowed to the point
where individual movies, such as Casablanca or Citizen Kane, constitute discrete product
markets. Nonetheless, as explained by the Supreme Court in United States v. Continental
Can Company, a court or enforcement agency must draw the product market line to
reasonably reflect competition. See 378 U.S. 441, 449 (1964). A relevant market defini-
tion that encompasses every substitute of an infinite range for a product is overly broad.
See id. Similarly, a product market definition that requires "products [to] be fungible to
be considered in the relevant market" is too narrow. Id. Therefore, the Continental Can
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Once a court or enforcement agency has determined the product
market for a multimedia merger, it must delineate the relevant
geographic market.48 ' Nonetheless, because the law of geographic
markets parallels that of product markets, multimedia substitutabili-
ty, clustering, and market behavior also determine the geographic
market.8 2 In addition, courts might consider: (1) any overlap of
broadcasting signals;4 3 (2) the area of a certain periodical's circula-
tion;48 (3) industry and regulatory definitions of the geographic
market;485 (4) the existence of any trade associations, societies, or
journals;486 and, to a lesser degree, (5) both parties' stipulations of
the appropriate geographic market.487  While these criteria should
court stressed that "[iun defining the product market between these terminal extremes, we
must recognize meaningful competition where it is found to exist." id. (emphasis added).
The Continental Can rationale applies directly to multimedia product market defini-
tions. Narrowing the relevant market to that for children's movies or action movies does,
in fact, require the products to be "fungible," and equates to an overly narrow product
market. By the same token, a product market that forgoes the narrowing process altogeth-
er, leaving the relevant market as "a very broad-ranging one for 'eyeballs,"' may be
excessively broad. But see Joffe Letter, supra.
A movies genre product market definition, in contrast, finds a mid-point between
these "terminal extremes." Specifically, a consumer is unlikely to perceive other content
genres-such as sports or music videos-as reasonable substitutes for movies on broad-
cast television, cable television, or in movie theaters. See supra notes 455, 465 and
accompanying text (explaining that the content of media influences a consumer's percep-
tion of interchangeability). Therefore, content genres are more likely to recognize mean-
ingful competition for multimedia than the terminal extremes of all-encompassing or all-
exclusive product market definitions.
481. See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text (describing the law of geograph-
ic markets).
• 482. See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text (explaining that both product
and geographic market definitions turn on product substitutability, the clustering doctrine
and market behavior).
483. See supra note 382 and accompanying text (discussing Ralph C. Wilson v.
American Broadcasting).
484. See supra note 295 and accompanying text (discussing newspaper circulation
as evidence of the geographic market).
485. See supra note 382 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory and industry
standards as evidence of developing geographic market for television and radio indus-
tries); supra note 296 and accompanying text (stating that the newspaper industry's
definition of the geographic market influenced the court's definition).
486. See supra notes 288-90 and accompanying text (discussing trade associations,
societies, and journals as evidence of the relevant product market).
487. See supra notes 319-20 and accompanying test (explaining that the court moved
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guide a court or enforcement agency in establishing the "area of
effective competition," the geographic market ultimately should be
defined to encompass any commercially significant area which can
reasonably be said to confine the relevant commercial activities.488
2. Estimating the Unified Firm's Power in the
Relevant Market
Once a court or enforcement agency has defined the relevant
market, the second step of the antitrust merger analysis for the
multimedia industry is to estimate the degree of power that the
unified firm would possess in that market.489 As discussed in Part
I above, determining market power requires a three part analysis.490
First, the court must identify competing multimedia firms by apply-
ing the above market definition rules to other media conglomerates
that currently produce or sell the market's products in the market's
geographic area.491 Second, the court must compute market shares,
based on any number of criteria: (1) total sales expressed in either
dollar or physical terms; (2) the number of actual points of commu-
nication (such as the number of screens that motion picture exhibi-
tors own in a particular market); or (3) the number of consumers
served in the relevant market (e.g., readers in the case of periodi-
cals and computerized information services, listeners in the case of
radio, and viewers in the case of various video programming me-
dia).492
In the third part of the analysis, the court or enforcement agen-
cy must estimate the concentration of the relevant market.493 Be-
quickly over geographic market definition, where parties both stipulated that it was Las
Vegas, Nevada).
488. See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text (discussing the law of geograph-
ic markets).
489. See supra notes 175-216 and accompanying text (explaining that the second step
of the antitrust merger analysis is estimating market power).
490. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text (explaining that estimating
market power is a series of three ministeps).
491. See supra notes 176, 179-83 and accompanying test (describing the process of
identifying competitor firms).
492. See supra notes 177, 184-85 and accompanying text (discussing the process of
calculating market shares).
493. See supra notes 178, 186-216 and accompanying text (discussing the process
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cause market concentration is often an abstract and inexact concept,
courts, the DOJ, and the FTC favor the HHI-an objective and
easy-to-understand formula.494 Nonetheless, the test for market
power is not always as simple as computing a firm's market share
to see if it exceeds a critical threshold.495 As the Supreme Court
warned nearly fifty years ago, "[t]he relative effect of percentage
command of a market varies with the setting in which that factor
is placed., 49
6
An overly rigid test, then, could potentially obscure the reality
that "market power" varies significantly with the structural and
political factors of some markets.497 Indeed, mergers and acquisi-
tions that result in a post-transaction HHI of less than 1000 could
escape antitrust scrutiny, and yet still pose anticompetitive and
antidemocratic threats.498 Moreover, such threats are especially
prevalent in the media industry, where even minimal economic
control may equate to significant influence over public sources of
information.4  When two firms that inform the population merge,
the decrease in the number of competitors may threaten the free
flow of information, quite apart from any economic repercus-
sions.50 Therefore, while the HHI may provide an objective and
somewhat useful standard, the antitrust investigator should not
overemphasize the importance of the formula in deciding whether
to proceed with a full antitrust analysis of multimedia mergers and
of estimating market concentration).
494. See supra notes 201-16 and accompanying text (defining the HHI).
495. See supra note 191 (explaining that an overly rigid test has the potential for
both "false positive" and "false negative" risk). For similar reasons, relying on certain
HHI thresholds to determine when a market has become concentrated is also too rigid.
See supra notes 207-16 and accompanying text (describing the various HHI thresholds on
which the DOJ and the FTC rely).
496. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 528 (1948).
497. Id.
498. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text (explaining that mergers in
markets with an HHI of under 1000 are rarely challenged by the DOJ or the FTC).
499. See supra note 186 (explaining that media is an industry in which market
concentration is particularly abstract).
500. See Pearl, supra note 18, at A10; supra note 186 (discussing market concentra-
tion and the media industry).
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acquisitions. 50 1 Nonetheless, until a more flexible methodology is
developed for measuring market concentration in the multimedia
industry, courts should continue to use the HHI in the multimedia
antitrust analysis.5°2
3. Examining Multimedia Industry- and Transaction-
Specific Factors
As discussed in Part I above, examining industry- and transac-
tion-specific factors is the third and final step in determining
whether a merger or acquisition violates Section 7 of the Clayton
Act.503 From an economic standpoint, one may argue that the bar-
riers to entry to some areas of the media industry are extremely
low. 5(  After all, "freedom of speech" is, by definition, free. Fur-
thermore, one commentator has suggested that new technology,
such as the Internet's "World Wide Web, 505 ensures that all view-
points, no matter how controversial, may reach the public.50°  Un-
der such rationale, entry into the multimedia market is so easy as
to eliminate anticompetitive concerns of multimedia mergers and
acquisitions.
501. See supra note 205 (explaining that some courts downplay the reliability of the
HHI).
502. This Note does not suggest that threats to the marketplace of ideas be quantified
for HHI calculations. Nonetheless, these threats should, at a minimum, supplement HHI
calculations. Therefore, courts could adopt a rle whereby the HHI establishes a rebutta-
ble presumption as to market concentration, but that evidence of reasonable structural and
political factors is admissible.
503. See supra notes 217-57 (discussing the final step of the antitrust merger analy-
sis: examining industry- and transaction-specific factors).
504. Nonetheless, there still may be legal and regulatory barriers. See Jonathan W.
Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Ownership Regulations, 38 CATH. U. L.
REV. 401, 418 (1989); Boadwee, supra note 149, at 1225 n.108.
505. The "World Wide Web" ("WWW") "links servers across the Internet." Sympo-
sium, First Amendment and the Media: Regulating Interactive Communications on the
Information Superhighway: The Changing Landscape of First Amendment Jurisprudence
in Light of the Technological Advances in Media, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 235, 240 n.13 (1995). Specifically, the WWW "utilizes electronic links to
connect documents, images, sounds, and video-or specific parts of such media--to each
other." Georgia K. Harper, The University Pursuit of the Promise of the New Media, 13
CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 447, 449 (1993). The electronic links "are called hypertext
links, hyperlinks, or simply links." Id.
506. Symposium, supra note 227, at 439-40 (comments of Joffe).
507. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text (explaining that mergers in
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Nonetheless, free speech comes at a price. While the U.S.
Constitution protects an individual's right to speak, it does not
guarantee that a mass audience will receive the message."' 8 More-
over, certain controversial viewpoints on a "Web sight in Zaire" 5°9
simply may not compete with those same viewpoints when they
appear on an established and, presumably, objective 24 hour cable
television news channel. Consequently, the public may not per-
ceive the World Wide Web as a legitimate substitute for news,
commentaries, and editorials on television or radio. Therefore, the
multimedia industry should be examined with the same traditional
efficiency and market entry analyses as any other industry.
With this in mind, a court might consider a number of industry-
specific factors in determining whether a particular multimedia
merger is anticompetitive. For example, the content on certain me-
dia, such as broadcast television, are more highly regulated than
other media.510 In addition, some media are limited physically in
the number of distribution channels on which they may be offered.
An example includes the radio industry, which can only broadcast
on a finite number of frequencies. Consequently, broadcast televi-
sion and radio have higher barriers to entry than other types of
media.
While proponents of the Chicago School Approach for evaluat-
ing multimedia mergers would conclude the antitrust analysis with
entry and efficiency analyses,51' supporters of the Multivalued Ap-
proach would examine the social and political ramifications of the
proposed transaction. 2 At the most extreme and controversial
level, some proponents of the Multivalued Approach would even
extend those socio-political implications to include First Amend-
industries with low barriers to entry are less likely to be deemed anticompetitive).
508. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (establishing the freedom of speech).
509. Symposium, supra note 227, at 440 (comments of Joffe).
510. See supra note 457 and accompanying text (explaining that the content on some
forms of media is more heavily regulated than on others, thereby limiting competition
among some media).
511. See supra notes 240-45 and accompanying text (discussing the Chicago School
approach).
512. See supra notes 246-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Multivalued
approach).
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ment concerns:"' "that the widest possible dissemination of infor-
mation from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public."514.
. Without advocating either approach in general, the antitrust
model that this Note proposes addresses the considerations of both
the Multivalued Approach and the purely-economic Chicago School
Approach. As explained above, the First Amendment concerns that
multimedia mergers and acquisitions limit the number of channels
for communication are intertwined inseparably with traditional
Chicago School notions of "competition" and "substitutability."
Consequently, this Note protects the social and political ramifica-
tions of multimedia mergers and acquisitions by developing an
antitrust model that "recognize[s] competition where, in fact, com-
petition exists."5 5
To illustrate how the proposed model addresses both the Chica-
go School and the Multivalued Approaches, assume a merger be-
tween a 24 hour cable television news channel, such as New York
1 in New York City,5 16 and a regional newspaper, such as the New
York Post.517 Assume further that both New York 1 and the New
York Post report some national news, but focus primarily on events
that occur in, and affect, New York City.518 Under the historical
antitrust analysis of the media industry, a court would probably not
include New York 1 and the New York Post in the same product
market, because courts in the past generally have not regarded
television stations and newspapers as substitutes. 9 While this
historical approach to an antitrust analysis of the merger would
fulfill the Chicago School Approach because it would be purely
513. Symposium, supra note 227, at 433 (comments of Joffe).
514. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
515. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 326.
516. See supra notes 364, 432 (discussing the cable television channel New York 1).
517. See supra notes 364, 432 (discussing the New York Post).
518. These events might include local politics, news, sporting events, social calen-
dars, etc.
519. See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text (explaining that courts generally
do not include other forms of media in the relevant product market definition for the
newspaper antitrust analysis); supra notes 364, 432 (discussing a potential product market
which would include New York 1 and the New York Post).
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economic, the analysis would not satisfy the Multivalued Approach
because the analysis would not consider any socio-political rami-
fications that could potentially follow from the merger.
Nonetheless, under the proposed model, a court would probably
place New York 1 and the New York Post in the same "news and
information" content genre. 20 Specifically, a court would likely
find that both media compete, because they communicate nearly
identical content at comparable prices to the consumer.52" ' Conse-
quently, a court would probably include both New York 1 and the
New York Post in the same relevant market definition.
In contrast to the historical analysis of this hypothetical merger,
the analysis under the proposed model would address both the
Chicago School and the Multivalued Approaches. First, the pro-
posed model would comport with the Chicago School because it
applies an economically-based antitrust analysis to the New York
1-New York Post merger. Intangible First Amendment and other
socio-political concerns would not enter into the analysis; the mod-
el would focus solely on competition between the two media.
Second, the proposed model would also satisfy the Multivalued
Approach. This is because it would recognize that a hypothetical
merger between New York 1 and the New York Post would elimi-
nate an editorial voice over New York City's "marketplace of
ideas. '522 Therefore, the model that this Note proposes protects the
socio-political concerns of the Multivalued Approach, by develop-
ing a Chicago School, economically-based analysis that focuses on
520. To a lesser extent, both New York 1 and the New York Post may also compete
from the supply side. That is, both media presumably compete for researchers, reporters,
and writers, all of whom know and understand New York City history, politics, and
sports.
521. The New York Post can be purchased in New York City for $0.50 per daily
copy, whereas New York 1 is included in Time Warner's basic cable television service,
which, as a package, costs a consumer approximately $0.90 per day. See, e.g., Billing
Statement from Time Warner Cable to Elizabeth A. Bloomer (Feb. 17, 1996) (on file with
author). Note, however, that because New York 1 is sold in a package of Time Warner's
basic cable television service, the product market may have to be broadened under the
proposed model to include all "clustered" channels. See supra notes 474-80 and accom-
panying text (discussing the "cluster market" doctrine as it applies to the proposed mod-
el).
522. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (discussing some commentators'
concerns that mergers between media companies restrict the marketplace of ideas).
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competition across sub-categories of the multimedia industry.
CONCLUSION
Courts and enforcement agencies need a new antitrust model
for analyzing mergers and acquisitions in the rapidly advancing
multimedia industry. This Note develops a model that protects the
social and political concerns surrounding multimedia mergers and
acquisitions, by focusing on traditional economic concepts of com-
petition and product substitutability. By approaching antitrust law
in such a manner, this model addresses the both Multivalued Ap-
proach and the Chicago School Approach for determining the
anticompetitive effects of consolidation within the multimedia in-
dustry.

